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HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND END-OF-DAY PRICE DISLOCATION 
 
Abstract 
 
We show that the presence of high frequency trading (HFT) has significantly mitigated 
the frequency and severity of end-of-day price dislocation, counter to recent concerns expressed 
in the media.  The effect of HFT is more pronounced on days when end of day price dislocation 
is more likely to be the result of market manipulation on days of option expiry dates and end of 
month.  Moreover, the effect of HFT is more pronounced than the role of trading rules, 
surveillance, enforcement and legal conditions in curtailing the frequency and severity of end-of-
day price dislocation.  We show our findings are robust to different proxies of the start of HFT 
by trade size, cancellation of orders, and co-location. 
 
Keywords:    High frequency trading, End-of-day Price dislocation, Manipulation, Trading 
Rules, Surveillance, Law and Finance 
 
JEL Codes:   G12, G14, G18, K22 1 
 
"There is nothing so terrible as activity without insight." 
-  Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
1. Introduction 
  High frequency trading (HFT) has become commonplace in many exchanges around the 
world.  HFT involves implementing proprietary trading strategies through the use computerized 
algorithms.  HFTs rapidly trade in and out of positions thousands of times a day without holding 
positions at the end of the day, and profit by competing for consistent albeit small profits on each 
trade.  While estimates vary due to the difficulty in ascertaining whether each trade is an HFT, 
recent estimates suggest HFT accounts for 50-70% of equity trades in the U.S., 40% in Canada, 
and 35% in London (Chang, 2010; Grant, 2011; O’Reilly, 2012).  The growth in HFT activities 
has generated plenty of attention from financial market regulators and commentators,
1 
particularly as HFTs were found to have contributed to the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash by 
withdrawing liquidity (Easley et al., 2010).   Some commentators have likewise expressed 
concern that HFT might increase the prevalence of market manipulation (Biais and Woolley, 
2011).  However, prior work has not empirically examined the impact of HFT on specific forms 
of price manipulation.   
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Huw Jones, “EU Lawmaker Turns Screws on Ultra-Fast Trading”, Reuters (March 26, 2012); Lucas 
Mearian, “SEC Probes High-Speed Traders,” Compterworld (March 26, 2012); Chlistalla (2011).  Commentators 
indicated recently that “[l]eading fund managers are calling for greater regulation of high frequency trading which 
they warn is resulting in market manipulation”; see Financial Review, August 15 2102, 
http://afr.com/p/business/companies/crack_down_on_high_frequency_trading_CSA9PgK9WGQJp9sgngTF7K.  
FINRA even asked high frequency trading firms to disclose computer codes in order to check for manipulative 
strategies; see http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/01/us-financial-regulation-algos-idUSTRE7806J420110901  2 
 
In this paper, we directly examine the link between HFT and one very important and 
specific form of manipulation: end-of-day price dislocation.  ‘Closing’ or ‘end-of-day’ [hereafter 
EOD] prices are extremely important for a number of reasons, including the fact that they are 
often used to determine the expiration value of derivative instruments and directors’ options, 
price of seasoned equity issues, evaluate broker performance, compute net asset values of mutual 
funds, and compute stock indices (Comerton-Forde and Putnins, 2011).
2  As such, there is 
massive incentive to manipulate closing price by ramping up end of day trading to push the 
closing price to an artificial level. 
Specifically, we examine closing price dislocation from 22 stock exchanges around the 
world from January 2003 – June 2011.  We construct a monthly panel dataset of the frequency 
and severity of EOD price dislocation cases.  Suspected cases on EOD price dislocation are 
based on consideration of a significant increase in the EOD returns, trading activity in the last 
part of the day, and bid-ask spreads, as well as a reversion to natural price level the following 
morning (Cahart et al., 2002; Hillion and Suominen, 2004; Comerton-Forde and Putnins, 2011; 
Branch and Evans, 2011).  These cases considered herein were in fact developed with market 
surveillance authorities and their software developers for the respective countries, including 
Capital Markets CRC, and SMARTS, Inc. 
We relate the frequency and severity of EOD price dislocation across markets and over 
time to the introduction of high-frequency trading.  The actual start date of HFT, if at all, is not 
known with precise accuracy across all markets around the world.  Nevertheless, HFT is usually 
                                                 
2 For related work on market manipulation and exchange governance, see Aggarwal and Wu (2006), Allen and Gale, 
(1992), Allen and Gorton (1992), Carhart et al. (2002), Merrick et al. (2005),  O'Hara (2001), O’Hara and Mendiola 
(2003), Peng and Röell (2009), Pirrong (1999, 2004), and Röell (1993). 3 
 
characterized by large number of orders with smaller order quantities, speedy cancellations, and 
tending to have short position-holding periods with almost no overnight position (Aldridge, 
2009; Brogaard, 2010; Gomber, et al., 2011; Henrikson, 2011).  To this end, we examine when 
there were unusual changes in market trading patterns over the January 2003 – June 2011 to 
identify when, if at all, HFT was likely having a significant influence in the marketplace.   
Moreover, we consider other factors such as whether or not the exchange has direct market 
access (DMA), which is a requirement for HFT.  We examine the robustness of our findings to 
different proxies to identify the material presence of HFT in a marketplace, including trade size, 
cancellation of orders, and co-location (see the Appendix). 
The data examined in this paper show that marketplaces with a significant presence of 
HFT are substantially less likely to experience EOD price dislocation and more severe EOD 
price dislocation.  In particular, the number of suspected EOD price dislocation cases decrease 
by 7.64 cases per month due to HFT in the most conservative estimate; given the average 
number of cases per month in the data is 36.56, this means that HFT decreases the probability of 
EOD dislocation by 20.90%.  This effect is statistically significant regardless of the empirical 
methods and control variables.  Moreover, HFT is associated with a decrease in the total trading 
value surrounding per suspected dislocating the EOD price case by the most conservative 
estimate of 41.09% relative to the average size of the total trading value surrounding per 
suspected dislocating the EOD price case; the least conservative estimate is 64.71%.  
Interestingly, on days when end of day dislocation is more likely to be attributable to 
manipulation, the effect of HFT is even more pronounced.  At the end of month and on days 
when options expire, HFT reduces the number of cases by 72-80%, (while the economic 
significance of HFT on the reduction on average trading values is analogous to the other days).   4 
 
It is noteworthy that policy mechanisms, including trading rules, surveillance and 
enforcement, appear to have had less of an effect in mitigating EOD price dislocation.  This is 
surprising, since these mechanisms have been shown to improve market quality in terms of 
increased liquidity, lower bid-ask spreads, improved market capitalization and greater numbers 
IPOs (Aitken and Siow, 2003; La Porta et al., 2006; Cumming and Johan, 2008; Jackson and 
Roe, 2009; Cumming et al., 2011).  By contrast, HFT is prevalent only on the most liquid 
exchanges around the world, and yet policy mechanisms have had less of an effect in curtailing 
the positive outcomes of HFT in terms of less pronounced and less frequent EOD price 
dislocation.   
Our paper is related to a small but growing literature on HFT.  The benefits and costs of 
HFT are nicely summarized by Biais and Woolley (2011).  Potential benefits of HFT include: (1) 
HFT can help ensure that related assets remain consistently priced due to increased liquidity 
(Chaboud et al, 2009); (2) HFT algorithms can help traders cope with market fragmentation by 
fostering competition between trading mechanisms, including exchanges and other platforms; 
and (3) HFT algorithms can mitigate traders’ cognition limits and traders’ limited rationality.  
Brogaard (2010) found that the participation rate of HFT in the sample NASDAQ equity trading 
data used in his study is approximately 75% and he concluded that HFT play a vital role in the 
price efficiency and price discovery process. Hendershott and Riordan (2010) and Hendershott et 
al. (2011) find consistent evidence from NASDAQ on the important role of HFT in price 
discovery and liquidity.   
Biais and Woolley (2011) also note that potential costs of HFT include: (1) manipulation 
in various ways that are described in section 2 below; (2) adverse selection in the sense that non-
HFT trades are slower and less well informed than HFT trades, thereby leading to a reduced 5 
 
market participation among non-HFT traders (i.e., HFT trades impose a negative externality of 
adverse selection on non-HFT traders); (3) imperfect competition among HFT traders and non-
HFT traders due to the large fixed costs of establishing HFTs; and (4) systematic risk, which 
might increase if HFT algorithms rely on similar strategies which are correlated.  In respect of 
the first point, we are not aware of any systematic evidence on the effect of HFT on market 
manipulation.  In respect of the latter point, there is mixed evidence on the impact of HFT on 
volatility depending on the context.  Focused on the recent Flash Crash in the United States 
financial market that occurred on May 6
th, 2010, Kirilenko, et al. (2011) argue that High-
frequency traders (HFTs) did not activate the Flash Crash but rather intensified the market 
volatility.  However, Brogaard (2010) finds that, rather than increasing stock volatility due to 
more frequent trading, HFT reduces stock volatility.   
Our paper does not weight-in on each of these specific benefits or costs, but rather 
focuses on the narrow question of whether or not HFT affects the frequency and magnitude of 
EOD price dislocation.  Overall, our findings imply HFT makes it more difficult for market 
manipulators to manipulate EOD closing prices.  Our central finding is therefore consistent with 
the extant evidence and results in Brogaard (2010), Hendershott and Riordan (2010) and 
Hendershott et al. (2011) on the valuable role for HFT in facilitating price discovery.  Our 
findings do not imply that HFT makes it more or less difficult to manipulate prices or volume in 
other ways, as those issues are beyond the scope of our paper.  It may well be the case that future 
efforts in monitoring HFT are warranted among policymakers and surveillance authorities, but 
such efforts should not inhibit the role of HFT in facilitating a reduction in EOD price 
dislocation. 6 
 
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses EOD price dislocation in relation 
to HFT as well as various policy mechanisms designed to curb price dislocation. Section 3 
introduces the data used in this paper and univariate tests results are  presented in Section 4.  
Section 5 presents multivariate analyses of the relation between the end of day price dislocation 
and high frequency trading.  Concluding remarks follow in the last section. 
2. Market Manipulation 
2.1. HFT and Market Manipulation 
  There are theoretical reasons either way in terms of whether or not HFT mitigates market 
manipulation or exacerbates market manipulation.  In this subsection, we first describe the 
possibility of HFT exacerbating manipulation, and then consider with some arguments as to why 
HFT might mitigate manipulation. 
  HFT, by virtue of the speed of the entering orders and execution of transactions, have the 
potential scope for facilitating manipulation more easily in a number of ways.  First, HFT can be 
used to enter purchase orders at successively higher prices to create the appearance of active 
interest in a security, which is also termed as ramping/gouging.  This type of HFT strategy is 
sometime referred to as ‘smoking’, or luring non-HFT orders (Biais and Woolley, 2011).  This 
can also take the form of pump and dump schemes whereby HFT is used to generate a significant 
increase in price and volume for a security, carry out a quick flip, and the securities are then sold 
(often to retail customers) at the higher price.  Another similar type of price manipulation takes 
the form of pre-arranged trading.  Pre-arranged trades involve colluding parties simultaneously 
entering orders at an identical price and volume, which might be easier to coordinate with across 
HFT systems.  Because pre-arranged trades avoid the order queue, they can influence the price of 7 
 
a security.  Similarly, market setting is a form of manipulation whereby HFT could be used to 
cross-orders at the short-term high or low to effect the volume weighted average price, or to set 
the price in one market for the purpose of a cross in another market.   These forms of price 
manipulation are often geared towards EOD trades to manipulate the closing market price of the 
security, particularly since the EOD price affect the expiration value of derivative instruments 
and directors’ options, the price of seasoned equity issues, broker performance evaluation, the 
net asset values of mutual funds, and the value of stock indices. 
HFT can also be used to exacerbate spoofing.  Spoofing, also known as “painting the 
tape”, is a form of market manipulation that involves actions taken by market participants to give 
an improper or false impression of unusual activity or price movement in a security.  Spoofing 
may take the form of fictitious orders, giving up priority, layering of bids-asks, and switches.  
The more general act of entering fictitious orders involve entering orders on one side of the 
market, then completing orders on the other side of the market and deleting the original order 
after the trade occurs.  Giving up priority refers to deleting orders on one side of the market as 
they approach priority and then entering the order again on the same side of the market.   
Layering of bids-asks refers to traders or brokers that stagger orders from the same client 
reference at different price and volume levels to give the misleading impression of greater 
interest in the security from a more diverse set of exchange participants, and might be viewed as 
being carried out for the purpose of manipulation.  Switches involve deleting orders on one side 
of the market as they approach priority and then entering the order again on the opposite side of 
the market.   
Finally, the presence of HFT may manipulate markets by ‘stuffing’ orders, thereby 
making it more difficult for non-HFT orders to execute.  HFT has an obvious speed advantage, 8 
 
and regular traders entering non-HFT orders suffer a technological disadvantage from not being 
able to have orders reach the exchange in the same time period.  Moreover, there are large fixed 
costs of setting up HFT systems, and regular market participants, particularly retail participants, 
are less able to incur such fixed costs. 
On the other hand, there are at least two reasons to believe that HFT will on average 
curtail market manipulation for the following reasons.  First, exchange surveillance systems are 
designed to pick up patterns of illegal manipulation, and not one-off manipulation.  HFT orders 
are by definition following a computer algorithm, and therefore HFT systems set with the view 
towards manipulation are much more likely to set off a real-time alert to a securities surveillance 
officer (Cumming and Johan, 2008).  Second, HFT has been reported to have significance 
benefits of increasing liquidity, reducing bid-ask spreads and facilitating price discovery 
(Brogaard, 2010; Hendershott and Riordan, 2010; Hendershott et al., 2011; for related work see 
also Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012; Edelen and Kadlec, 2012).  It is much more difficult for 
manipulators to engage in market manipulation in the presence of greater market efficiency 
(Aitken and Siow, 2003).  
Overall, given the theoretical reasons either way in terms of whether HFT mitigates or 
exacerbates manipulation, it is necessary to test the effect with the use of large sample data from 
many exchanges around the world.  For the first time, we provide such tests in the empirical 
analyses in the subsequent sections of this paper. 
2.2. Trading Rules, Surveillance and Other Factors Pertinent to Manipulation 
  Apart from HFT, there are a number of factors that can affect the likelihood of 
manipulation across exchanges and over time.  First, surveillance systems are not of equal 9 
 
quality across countries, and superior systems are more likely to curtail the presence of 
manipulators (Cumming and Johan, 2008).  Second, exchange trading rules have the ability to 
improve market liquidity (Cumming et al., 2011) and have the ability to signal to market 
participants that specific types of illegal activity are illegal.  Third, the quality of enforcement of 
illegal activity varies across countries (La Porta et al., 1998, 2006 ; Jackson and Roe, 2009; 
Banerjee and Eckard, 2001), which in turn can influence the likelihood that manipulators will be 
present in a marketplace. 
  In addition to rules, surveillance and enforcement, there are other market wide 
differences across countries and exchanges.  In particular, some exchanges are much more liquid 
for reasons related to the development of the particular exchange or national economy.  To this 
end, when assessing the presence of market manipulation, it is important to account for market 
condition differences across exchanges as well as over time.  We consider these factors in our 
empirical tests below. 
3. Data 
Our sample comprises 22 stock exchanges whose trading data are included in commonly 
used data sources such as Thomson Reuters Datastream.  The sample comprises Australia, 
Canada, China (Shanghai and Shenzhen), Germany, Hong Kong, India (Bombay and the 
National Stock Exchange of India), Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South 
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the U.K., and the U.S. (NASDAQ and NYSE). The start 
date of HFT in the sample was determined with the methods described in the Appendix of this 
paper. 
 10 
 
International start dates of algorithmic trading (AT) and HFT are not well delineated or 
even known by most exchanges themselves (Aitken et al., 2012).  One approach is to identify 
news announcements on the timing of co-location (Boehmer et al., 2012).  Co-location involves 
an exchange renting a space to the trading firm next to the trading facility, which provides added 
speed for the flow of time-sensitive information.  When one asks the directors of the exchange 
themselves, it becomes quite clear that the precise start date is not always known due to the 
differential timing and ambiguous presence of AT and HFT orders in the market.  AT and HFT 
orders in all most countries began years in advance of co-location (this fact is documented in 
Aitken et al., 2012).  High frequency traders themselves are widely known to have physically 
located themselves next to the exchange in order to obtain time advantages, and established such 
proximate location long before co-location started.  Co-location is not a pre-requisite for 
algorithmic or high-frequency trading.  Therefore, even with proxies for co-location start dates, 
where defined, such start dates do not measure “effective” dates. “Effective” refers to the impact 
on the marketplace.   Impact in this case is most commonly studied by exchange participants 
through unusual and permanent drops in trading size.  Additional proxies for HFT effective dates 
include quote updates to trade ratio and the order entry/amendment/cancellation to trade ratio; 
these alternative methods do not materially affect our inferences drawn herein, unlike the 
differences observed with the co-location dates.  As explained further in the Appendix, we focus 
on the effective date based on trade size and cancellations to identify HFT start dates, not co-
location dates.  In our multivariate empirical tests below, we nevertheless include the co-location 
date as well as the effective HFT date in case there is an added marginal effect of co-location 
services offered by the exchange.   11 
 
The definitions and source of the variables used in the analyses are provided in Table 1.  
Our main dependent variables are the number of suspected dislocating the EOD price cases and 
the average trading value surrounding per suspected dislocating the EOD price case.  The 
dependent variables are based on actual identified suspected cases from surveillance authorities 
via SMARTS Group, Inc., and CMCRC.  SMARTS provides surveillance software to over 40 
exchanges around the world.  The SMARTS surveillance staff constructed the dislocation of 
EOD price case by looking at the price change between the last trade price (Pt)
3 and last available 
trade price 15 minutes before the continuous trading period ends (Pt-15).  A price movement is 
abnormal if it is four standard deviations away from the mean abnormal price change during the 
past 100 trading days benchmarking period. To be considered as dislocation of EOD price case, 
the price movement between the last trade price (Pt) and the next day opening price (Pt+1), and 
between last trade price (Pt) and last available trade price 15 minutes before the continuous 
trading period ends (Pt-15) has to be equal or bigger than 50%.
4  Table 2 indicates that the average 
(median) number of suspected dislocating the EOD price cases 36.56 (15) per exchange month in 
the sample, with a range from minimum zero to maximum of 1645.  The average (median) total 
trading value surrounding per suspected dislocating the EOD price case is US$685,637.80 
($142,727).   
[Tables 1 and 2 About Here] 
We use several exchange level variables covering monthly observations from January 
2003 to June 2011, the period considered by this study. The domestic market capitalization at the 
end of each month, monthly total trading volume, and data for the total number of trades for each 
                                                 
3 For securities exchanges that have closing auction, the close price at auction is used (Pauction). 
4 (Pauction or Pt - Pt+1)/( Pauction or Pt - Pt-15 ) ≥50% 12 
 
stock exchange are obtained from Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC).   
Some observations are missing, such as index values from La Porta et al. (1998) and Jackson and 
Roe (2009).  
Surveillance data are used from Cumming and Johan (2008) and updated to 2011.     
Cumming and Johan surveyed 25 exchanges around the world to ascertain the extent of single- 
and cross-market surveillance.  The data were obtained confidentially because a would-be 
manipulator might trade in ways that could not be detected if precise information about 
surveillance activity was available.  The data are based on an equally weighted index that adds 
one every time a different type of single- and cross-market manipulation is monitored.   
Exchange trading rule indices are obtained from Cumming et al. (2011), as summarized 
in Table 3.  Trading rules for these stock exchanges are found on the each exchange's webpage, 
with the sole exception of China, where the pertinent trading rules for the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchange are found on the China Securities and Regulatory Commission webpage. 
There are three primary legal indices introduced: the Insider Trading Rules Index, the Market 
Manipulation Rules Index, and the Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index. The Market 
Manipulation Rules Index consists of four subcomponents: the Price Manipulation Rules Index, 
the Volume Manipulation Rules Index, the Spoofing Manipulation Rules Index, and the False 
Disclosure Rules Index.  These indices are summarized in Table 2 for the pre- and post-MiFID 
periods for January 2003- June 2011.  The indices are created by summing up the number of 
specific provisions in the exchange trading rules in each country.  In the post-MiFID period the 
Insider Trading Rules Index varies from a low value of zero (for a number of exchanges listed in 
Table 2) to ten (for NASDAQ).  The Market Manipulation Rules Index varies from a low value 
of two (for Malaysia, Taiwan and Tokyo) to 13 (for London, NYSE).  The Broker-Agency 13 
 
Conflict Rules Index varies from a low value of zero (for Australia, Hong Kong, Germany, 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, Taiwan, Tokyo and OSLO) to five (for NASDAQ).  The total trading rule 
index is the sum of the Insider Trading Rules Index, the Market Manipulation Index, and the 
Broker-Agency Conflict Rules Index.  While present results in our regressions with the use of the 
Total Rules Index, the use of sub-indices does not materially impact our conclusions and 
findings herein. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
We use a series of law and finance indices from La Porta et al. (1998, 2006) and 
Spamann (2010), which includes the rule of law and efficiency of the judiciary.  Other legal 
indices were considered, but they did not impact the empirical tests reported below and are 
therefore excluded for conciseness.  Although we do have information on surveillance mentioned 
immediately above, we do not have data on enforcement of the trading rules that we analyze in 
this article; nevertheless, our understanding from our data sources for surveillance in Cumming 
and Johan (2008) is that enforcement is highly correlated with surveillance because otherwise 
exchanges would not bother to carry out surveillance.  To further proxy enforcement, we use 
prior indices of enforcement such as efficiency of the judiciary.  In other work, note that La Porta 
et al. (2006) finds evidence that private enforcement facilitates the development of stock 
markets, while Jackson and Roe (2009) find stronger evidence on the value of liability standards 
and public enforcement.  The difference in Jackson and Roe is that they employ more detailed 
resource-based measures such as budgets/GDP and staffing/population to study enforcement.  
These enforcement measures differ significantly across countries, but not over time.  We have 
considered all of the indices in the La Porta et al. (2006) and Jackson and Roe (2009); 14 
 
inclusion/exclusion of these indices does not materially affect the conclusions regarding HFT 
and other things presented herein.   
To control for the influence of market specific changes, we include control variables for 
volatility.  Also, we include both exchange and year-dummy variables in our multivariate 
analyses in section 4 below.  
4. Univariate Tests 
  Table 4 provides a comparison of means and medians tests for the number of suspected 
dislocating the EOD price cases in Panel A, and the total trading value surrounding per suspected 
dislocating the EOD price case in Panel B. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
  Table 4 Panel A shows that the market-capitalization weighted median number of 
suspected dislocating the EOD price cases is 0.01in HFT exchange time periods, which is lower 
than the 0.13 weighted median number of cases in non HFT-exchange time periods; however, 
due to a few outliers, the market-capitalization weighted average for the number of EOD cases is 
higher at 3.54 for HFT than the 0.64 for non-HFT countries.  These differences in means and 
medians are significant at the 1%.  Moreover, considering the impact of introducing HFT in a 
market, Table 4 Panel A shows that post-HFT exchanges had on average (median) 1.05 (0.004) 
cases, which is lower than the average (median) of 6.70 (0.04) in pre-HFT time periods.  Again, 
these differences in means and medians are significant at the 1% level.   
Figure 1 plots the indexed average number of EOD price dislocation cases for HFT and 
non-HFT exchanges.  The values for HFT countries are presented surrounding the date 0, which 15 
 
is indexed to the start time of HFT in a particular country to compare pre- and post-HFT in a 
given country.  Figure 1 is consistent with the tests in Table 4 Panel A highlighting the fact that 
EOD price dislocation cases are less frequently associated with HFT both in terms of comparing 
pre- and post-HFT time periods and HFT and non-HFT exchanges. 
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
  Table 4 Panel B shows that the market-capitalization weighted average (median) trading 
value surrounding suspected the EOD price dislocation cases is 40586.67 (27.82) in HFT 
exchange time periods, which is lower than the 118325.60 (269.01) average (median) trading 
value surrounding cases in non HFT-exchange time periods.  These differences are significant at 
the 1% level.  We also compare the values pre- and post-introduction of HFT.  Considering the 
impact of introducing HFT in a market, Table 4 Panel B shows that post-HFT exchanges had a 
market capitalization weighted average (median) 22465.07 (35.45) trading value surrounding 
cases, which is lower (higher) than the average (median) of 63554.75 (18.75) in pre-HFT time 
periods.  This difference in means is significant at the 1% level, but the difference in median is 
not statistically significant. 
Figure 2 plots the indexed total trading value surrounding EOD price dislocation cases 
for HFT and non-HFT exchanges.  The values for HFT countries are presented surrounding the 
date 0, which is indexed to the start time of HFT in a particular country to compare pre- and 
post-HFT in a given country.  Moreover, the indexing of the values negates the scale effect in 
Table 4 Panel B for comparing HFT and non-HFT countries discussed above.  Figure 1 clearly 
shows that EOD price dislocation cases are less frequently associated with HFT both in terms of 
comparing pre- and post-HFT time periods and HFT and non-HFT exchanges.   16 
 
[Insert Figure 2 About Here] 
Overall, these comparison tests support the view that HFT is associated with a lower 
frequency of EOD price dislocation.  Further, the pre- versus post-HFT tests support the view 
that there is less trading value surrounding EOD price dislocation cases.  The HFT versus non-
HFT value tests highlight the need to control for other things being equal across exchanges, as 
done in the next section with the multivariate tests. 
  Table 5 presents a correlation matrix for the main variables used in the multivariate tests 
provided in the next section.  The correlations highlight similar trends as in the comparison tests.  
As well, the correlations show areas in which collinearity is potentially problematic for 
regression analyses, and as such we present alternative specifications with and without collinear 
variables in the regressions in the subsequent section.  
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
5. Multivariate Tests 
5.1. Primary Results 
  Table 6 presents panel data regression results with 9 alternative econometric models for 
the two dependent variables for the number of EOD price dislocation cases and the average 
trading value surrounding such cases. All dependent variables are winsorized at 99% in Table 6.  
The nine models include different sets of explanatory variables to highlight robustness.  Model 1 
and model 2 present difference-in-difference (DID) tests.   Models 3-6, and 8 include the HFT 
variable along with microstructure control variables in terms of exchange characteristics such as 
market capitalization, dollar volume, and the number of trades.  Models 5 include different sets 17 
 
of trading rule and enforcement variables, which is useful to show explicitly since many of these 
variables are highly correlated.  Models 6-9 include a complete set of variables all at once, with 
model 7 and 9 using HFT effective date defined by cancellation ratio.
5  Models 8 and 9 exclude 
the US observations.  We do not use two-way clustering in some of the models due to estimation 
problems with the time-invariant legal/country variables.  Models 5-9  use one-way clustering of 
errors by year, model 1 and 2 use one way clustering by month, while Models 3 and 4 use two-
way clustering by month and exchange.  We also control fixed effect at the exchange level on 
model 1. 
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
  Table 6 Panel A presents the regression results for the number of suspected EOD price 
cases.  The data show HFT is negatively associated with the number of suspected EOD cases, 
and this effect is significant at the 10% level for model 1 and 2, at 5% level for model 5, 6, 7, and 
9, and at 1% level for model 3, 4, and 8.  In terms of the economic significance, the data indicate 
that HFT gives rise to an average of 7.64  fewer cases in the most conservative estimate in Model 
2, and up to a reduction in cases by 40.07.  Given that the average number of cases per month per 
exchange is 36.56, this is equivalent to a conservative estimate of a reduction by 20.90% in the 
number of cases with HFT.
6    
                                                 
5 Our cancellation data (Table A3 in the Appendix) does not comprise data from OMX, SWX and NZX.  As such, 
we use the dates defined by trade size for those countries in these regressions.  We considered dropping those 
countries from these 2 models but the inferences were not materially different. 
6 Also, we considered a difference-in-differences estimator using the average start date for HFT across exchanges.  
We do not explicitly report this estimator because the average start date is an imperfect choice since the start dates 
vary widely across exchanges (see the Appendix).  This estimator showed a reduction in the number of cases by 
16.56 (significant at the 1% level), which is a reduction by 45.2% relative to the average number of cases of 36.56.  18 
 
  The co-location variable is statistically insignificant in all of the models in Table 6 Panel 
A.  This finding is consistent with the fact that HFT started long in advance of co-location (see 
the Appendix; see also Aitken et al., 2012). 
  The control variables in Table 6 Panel A show some consistent statistical significance in 
ways that are expected.  EOD price dislocation is less common with public enforcement (Models 
5, 8 and 9), less common among higher rule of law countries (Models3, 5-9), and more common 
when volatility is higher (Models 2-9).  These effects are significant at least at the 10% level.  
The other controls are either insignificant or not robust across different specifications. 
  Table 6 Panel B presents the regression results for the number of suspected EOD price 
cases.  The data indicate that HFT has a very pronounced role in mitigating the trading value 
surrounding EOD dislocating cases, and this effect is statistically significant at the 10% level in 
Models 1, 2 and 9, at the 5% level in Models,5, 7 and 8, and the 1% level in Model 3, 4 and 6.  
The economic significance shows that HFT curtails extreme events with EOD price dislocation 
cases.  The most conservative estimate is from Model 1 in Panel B, which shows a reduction by 
281720.3.  Given the average trading value surrounding EOD cases is 685637.8, this reduction is 
economically significant at 41.09% of the average value.  The least conservative estimate is from 
Model 4 in Panel B which shows a reduction by 443645.7, or 64.71%. 
  The co-location variable in Table 6 Panel B is insignificant in all specifications.  Hence, 
that latter timing of co-location relative to the start of HFT (Appendix; see also Aitken et al., 
2012) has on average had no material effect on trading values surrounding suspected cases. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Likewise, we considered other specifications all of which yielded consistent results that the number of cases goes 
down. 19 
 
The control variables show some consistent significance.  Trading value surrounding 
suspected cases is higher with public enforcement (Models 5-9) and lower with average market 
trade size (Models 3-8).  Log of trading volume is significant in Models 3, 4, 6 and 7, but not 
robust in the other models.  Similarly some of the surveillance and enforcement estimates are 
significant but the effects are not robust.   
5.2. Robustness Checks 
In the course of our empirical analyses we carried out a number of robustness checks.  
First, we considered different specifications of the dependent variables, such as without 
winsorizing and winsorizing at different levels, different time periods, etc.  Results with 
winsozing at the 95
th percentile appear in Table 7.  The findings are very consistent with that 
reported in Table 6, with the exception that the economic significance or the size of the effects is 
slightly smaller as expected. 
[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
Second, we report findings with other measures of end-of-day price dislocation by 
examining only end-of-month cases and only cases of end-of-day price dislocation that match 
with option expiry dates.  We examine these dates in particular since they are at times when 
dislocation is more likely to be attributable to manipulation (Comerton-Forde and Putnins, 2011).  
These findings are reported in Table 8.  The statistical significance of the results are consistent 
with those reported in Table 6 for the dependent variables in the other tables with all possible 
end-of-day price dislocation cases.  Interestingly, however, the economic significance of the 
results is more pronounced.  At the end of month and on days when options expire, HFT reduces 
the number of cases by 72-80% depending on the specification (relative to the average number of 20 
 
cases on those days).  However, the economic significance of HFT on the reduction on average 
trading values is analogous to the other days as reported in Table 6.   
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 
Third, instead of using total trading rules, we used subsets of the trading rules indices.  
Fourth, we considered other measures of law quality such as antidirector rights (La Porta et al., 
1998; Spamann, 2010), disclosure (La Porta et al., 2006) and other proxies for the resources 
devoted to securities regulation (Jackson and Roe, 2009).  Fifth, we considered other 
instrumental variable and difference-in-differences specifications (see footnote 5), such as with 
lagged dependent variables and other specifications.  Sixth, we considered possible outlier time 
periods and outlier exchanges.  Seventh, we considered other proxies for HFT, such as trending 
variables instead of a binary variable, to account for increases in HFT over time.  Eighth, we 
have considered other explanatory variables, including but not limited to other measures of 
volatility other than that reported in the tables.  These alternative models and checks, among 
others, did not suggest material differences to the array of results reported in the tables.   
Alternative specifications are available on request. 
Finally, recall in section 3 above we noted that some observations are missing, such as 
data from and index values from La Porta et al. (1998) and Jackson and Roe (2009).   We 
assessed robustness to excluding these legal observations by filling in missing values for the 
indices based on taking the median and mean values of the indices for the missing countries 
based on the countries of the same legal origin.  The results are extremely similar for each of 
Panels A and B in Table 6 when we re-run the regressions with the full sample.  We note that 
Model 1 in Table 6 uses the full set of observations and the findings are very consistent with the 21 
 
regressions which include variables with some missing observations.  Again, additional 
specifications and full details are available on request. 
6. Conclusions 
  This paper examined the relationship between HFT and EOD price dislocation in 22 
exchanges around the world spanning the period January 2003 – June 2011.  EOD price 
dislocation is one of the most common and important forms of price dislocation in view of the 
many important functions of EOD prices, such as computing index values, prices for related 
securities, compensation, and computing fund net asset values.  We examined data used by 
actual surveillance systems to ascertain suspected EOD price dislocation cases in a way that is 
consistent across exchanges.  We related the frequency and trading value surrounding suspected 
EOD price dislocation cases.  We controlled for a variety of market conditions, legal conditions, 
trading rules, surveillance and other differences across exchanges.   
  The data examined unambiguously indicate that in the presence of HFT, EOD price 
dislocation are on average less frequent in terms of the number of EOD price dislocation cases in 
the presence, and on less pronounced in terms of the average EOD trading value surrounding 
suspected cases.  In fact, HFT is the most robust and statistically significant factor that affects 
EOD price dislocation.   
The data also indicate that EOD price dislocation varies frequently with market 
conditions.  As well, the data indicate somewhat related to surveillance and regulatory standards 
in a country.  But the importance of HFT is much more consistently pronounced and effective in 
terms of mitigating the frequency and magnitude of price dislocation.   22 
 
Overall, the data support the view that the price discovery and liquidity function of HFT 
on average significantly dominates and role that HFT may play facilitating market price 
dislocation, at least with respect to the very important EOD price dislocation.  Future research 
could explore the effect of HFT on other types of manipulation.  As well, future research could 
explore differences in manipulation across different HFT firms pursuing different strategies.  It is 
possible that there are some HFT manipulators present in the market, and if so, it would be 
important to know the context in which their trades are executed to enable surveillance 
authorities and regulators to detect such forms of manipulation.  But overall the data considered 
herein show that the presence of HFT has done more good than harm and that manipulation, at 
least EOD manipulation, is not as pronounced under HFT as current regulatory concerns might 
suggest. 
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Appendix.  When Did HFT Start? 
In this Appendix we explain our three empirical strategies to identify the start of high-
frequency trading (HFT): trade size, order cancellations, and co-location.  Herein we refer to HFT 
and not algorithmic trading (AT).  Some prior studies have indicated that HFT is a subset of AT 
(Chlistalla, 2011; Gomber et al., 2011), while other studies have indicated that HFT is an instrument 
of AT (e.g., MacIntosh, 2013, European Commission Report, 2010).  Regardless, AT is by itself not 
likely to be associated with manipulation, while HFT is potentially associated (Biais and Wolley, 
2012).   While our start dates analyzed herein may pick up the start of both AT and HFT, we 
reference HFT herein due to our focus on manipulation. 
 HFT is usually characterized by large number of orders with smaller order quantities, speedy 
order cancellations, and tending to have short position-holding periods with almost no overnight 
position (Aldridge, 2009; Brogaard, 2010; Gomber, et al., 2011; Henrikson, 2011).  Many studies on 
HFT activities use data at trades and quotes level with detailed identification code to identify HFTs 
vs. non-HFTs.  Those studies often focus on single exchange or a group of highly liquid stocks over a 
short period (Brogaard, 2010; Kirilenko, et al., 2011; Baron, et al., 2012; Malinova, et al., 2012; 
Menkveld, 2012; Brogaard, et al., 2013; Carrion, 2013; Hirschey, 2013).  Table A1 provide a brief 
summary in term of size of HFT trading in various market and various methods academics use to 
identify HFTs.  An optimal proxy to define the HFTs' influence in our study would be a percentage 
of trading volume/value by HFT over the total market trading volume/value.  Our study covers 
twenty-two exchanges in seventeen countries over a period nine years.  Obtaining detailed trade and 
quote data over the whole period for all exchanges in our study was nearly impossible.  As such, we 
have developed two proxies to identify the impact of activities by HTF in each exchange and used 
this proxy to demonstrate whether or not HFT have significant impact on market quality.  In other 
words, we are not trying to pin point the start date of HFT activities in each exchange rather we are 
trying to identify the period of time that HFT have flourished and have significant market influence.  
 
Defining HFT Effective Dates Using Average Trade Size 
In order to identify the start time of HFTs’ influence on a market, we first check whether the 
exchange in our sample offers direct market access (DMA).  Eighteen out of twenty-two exchanges 
either have DMA access earlier compared to the start period of our data sample or have just began to 
offer DMA during the period of sample coverage.  Second, we obtained the monthly on market 28 
 
trading volume and number of trade for each exchange from January 2003 to December 2011 and 
calculate the average monthly market trading size as the monthly total on market trading volume over 
the monthly total number of trades. We define the start month of HFT influence on the market as the 
first of four continuously declining months in average market trading size or the biggest single drop 
from previous month.  We also exclude significant declines during the financial crisis period between 
2007 and 2008.  For example, the maximum four months decline for the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASE) is 42 percent which started on April, 2006 and the biggest single decline in trade size for 
OSLO Stock Exchange (OLSO) is 48 percent which occurred on May 2005.   Therefore, we define 
the HFT start date for ASE and OSE as April 2006 and May 2005, respectively.  We also looked at 
both the three-month and five-month continuous declines in average market trading size and found 
the results to be similar.   Few exchanges have continuously declines in trading size over five 
months.  Among eighteen exchanges, we were unable to observe any pattern of significant change for 
Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX), Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKX), or the two Korean stock 
exchanges (KOE and KSC) except during financial crisis period.  In these cases, we were unable to 
define a HFT start date.  Three exchanges NASDAQ, CHI-X London (CHIX) and XETRA German 
(XET) have a HFT start date at the beginning of the data period. Our final list contains fourteen 
exchanges from eleven different countries.  To confirm that there are changes in trading behaviours 
between pre-HFT and post-HFT period, we performed a comparison test on both the mean and 
median of average trading size.  Since by our definition, exchanges such as CHIX, NASDAQ, and 
XET have a start date at the beginning of our study period, they are excluded from the comparison 
test.  The results of the comparison test for all other exchanges as well as the HFT start date for each 
exchange are listed in Table A2, and shown graphically in Figures A1 and A2.   In general, on 
market average trading size drops significantly after the HFT date.  The average trading size dropped 
more than fifty percent after the HFT start date in six out of ten exchanges in the table. All 
comparison t-statistics are significant at the one percent level except the Bombay Stock Exchange 
(BSE) in India, which is significant at the five percent level.  The median test tells a similar story 
with the sole exception of the BSE which it is not significant at any level (although our findings in 
the paper are invariant to different treatment of the HFT variable for BSE).   
[Insert Tables A2 and Figures A1 and A2 About Here] 
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Defining HFT Effective Dates Using Order Cancellations 
Similar to the methods used for trade size, we collected the daily number of order 
cancellations and total trading volumes for each individual stock for each exchange.  We calculate 
the cancellation ratio for each stock as follows: 
   ,   
#	        
    /1000
 
where    , 	represents the Cancellation Ratio with the subscripts i inidcates the day of the 
month and j indicates the individual stock.  #	        	represent the total number of cancellation 
orders at the end of day for stock j and     	represent the total daily trading volume for stock j.  
Finally, we get the monthly cancellation ratio by taking the median of daily cancellation ratio 
within the month.  We define the HFT effective month as the first of five or more months of 
continuously increasing cancellation ratios.  For three exchanges, XET, BSE and NSE, we use 
the first of three months of continuously increase in the cancellation ratio since the cancellation 
ratio goes up and down more frequently, and the smallest increase in the cancellation ratio is 
more than 70% for three months among these three exchanges.  In order to collect the completed 
number of orders cancellation for each individual stocks, we need data for both sides of order 
book.  Several stock exchanges such as OMX, SWX, NZX, NASDAQ and CHI-X London have 
incomplete data or missing data. In the empirical test, we use the HFT effective date from the 
average trade size.  For NASDAQ and Chi-X London, we continue to define the HFT effective 
date as the beginning of data sample.  
Table A3 lists the HFT effective date and comparison of means and medians tests of 
cancellations on each exchange.  In general, on market average trading size drops significantly after 
the HFT start date, and the average cancellation ratio increases dramatically after the HFT start date 
in all exchanges. Compare with the HFT effective date defined using average trade size, we notice 
that several exchanges have the same date using two different methods such as National Stock 
Exchange in India (NSE), Australia Stock Exchange (ASX) and a few of them have date very close 
to each other.  For example, using average trade size, HFT effective date for Bombay stock Exchange 
(BSE) is May, 2009 and using cancellation ratio, the HFT effective date for BSE is June, 2009.  
Similarly, HFT effective date for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)is May 2003 and July 2003 
using average trade size and cancellation ratio, respectively.  In three exchanges, TMX, TSE and 30 
 
LSE, the HFT effective date defined using cancellation ratio is early than the date defined using 
average trade size. We also perform a comparison test on both mean and median of cancellation 
ratio for each exchange, and all comparison t-statistics are significant at the one percent level. 
Graphically, figure A3 and A4 illustrate a similar story. 
[Insert Tables A3 and Figures A3 and A4 About Here] 
 
Defining HFT Effective Dates Using Co-location Dates 
Finally, note that co-location involves an exchange renting a space to the trading firm next to 
the trading facility, which provides added speed for the flow of time-sensitive information.  Co-
location is not a pre-requisite for AT or HFT.  AT and HFT orders in all most countries began years 
in advance of co-location (Aitken et al., 2012).  High frequency traders themselves are widely known 
to have physically located themselves next to the exchange in order to obtain time advantages, and 
established such proximate location long before co-location started.  Nevertheless, we manually 
collect all known co-location offer date and Table A4 list the proximity hosting/co-location offer 
time for exchanges used in our study. 
[Insert Table A4 About Here] 
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Figure A1: Plot of indexed of market average trading size. Mean of the market average trading size(AVG) of HFT countries and non-HFT 
countries are showing here. The values for HFT countries are presented surrounding the date 0, which is indexed to the start time of HFT in a 
particular country to compare pre- and post-HFT in a given country.  For non-HFT countries, the zero month is January 2005.  The values for the 
non-HFT countries are also indexed to the zero date. 
 
Figure A2: Plot of indexed of market average trading size. Median of the market average trading size of HFT countries and non-HFT countries 
are showing here.   The values for HFT countries are presented surrounding the date 0, which is indexed to the start time of HFT in a particular 
country to compare pre- and post-HFT in a given country.  .  For non-HFT countries, the zero month is January 2005.  The values for the non-
HFT countries are also indexed to the zero date. 
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Figure A3:  Plot of indexed value of number of cancellations per 1000 traded shares(cancellation ratio). Mean value of cancellation ratio of HFT 
countries and non-HFT countries are showing here. The values for HFT countries are presented surrounding the date 0, which is indexed to the 
start time of HFT in a particular country to compare pre- and post-HFT in a given country.  For non-HFT countries, the zero month is January 
2005.  The values for the non-HFT countries are also indexed to the zero date. 
 
 
 
Figure A4::  Plot of indexed value of number of cancellations per 1000 traded shares(cancellation ratio). Median value of cancellation ratio of 
HFT countries and non-HFT countries are showing here. The values for HFT countries are presented surrounding the date 0, which is indexed to 
the start time of HFT in a particular country to compare pre- and post-HFT in a given country.  For non-HFT countries, the zero month is January 
2005.  The values for the non-HFT countries are also indexed to the zero date. 
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Table A1: Empirical Studies of High Frequency Trading (HFT)	
Authors  Title of the Working Paper  Markets  HFT Trading Activities  Identifying HFT 
Baron, Brogaard and 
Kirilenko (2012) 
The Trading Profits of High 
Frequency Traders 
E-mini S&P 500 equity 
index futures markets 
(US) 
46.8% of double-counted 
trading volume or 1.49 
million contact daily 
 
HFTs are defined as firms 
with high volume, low 
intraday inventory and low 
overnight inventory. 
Brogaard (2010)  High Frequency Trading and 
Its Impact on Market Quality  NASDAQ (US) 
60.4% to 75.9% of all 
dollar-volume traded daily 
 
NASDAQ indicator 
Brogaard, 
Hendershott and 
Riordan (2013) 
High Frequency Trading and 
Price Discovery 
NASDAQ and NYSE 
(US) 
42% of trading volume in 
large stocks and 18% 
trading volumes in small 
stocks. 
 
NASDAQ identify HFT 
firms based on the net 
trading day, order duration 
and order to trade ratio 
Carrion (2013) 
Very fast money: High-
Frequency trading on the 
NASDAQ. 
NASDAQ (US)  68.3% of all dollar trading 
volume  NASDAQ indicator 
Hagstomer and 
Norden (2012) 
The Diversity of High 
Frequency Traders 
NASDAQ-OMX 
Stockholm (Sweden) 
26% to 29% of total 
trading volume  
NASDAQ OMX in-house 
expertise identifies HFT 
firms based on their member 
activities. 
Hirschey (2013) 
Do High-Frequency Traders 
Anticipate Buying and Selling 
Pressure 
NASDAQ (US)  40% of trading volume  NASDAQ indicator 
Kirilenko, Kyle, 
Samadi and Tuzun 
(2010) 
The Flash Crash: The Impact 
of High Frequency Trading 
on an Electronic Market 
E-mini S&P 500 equity 
index futures markets 
(US) 
34% Total Trading 
Volume on May 3-5 and 
29% Total Trading 
Volume on May 6, 2010. 
HFTs are defined as traders 
with high volume and low 
inventory. 
Malinova, Park and 
Riordan (2012) 
Do Retail Traders Suffer from 
High Frequency Traders?  TMX (Canada)  82.1% of messages 
(March 1,  2012) 
HFTs are defined based on 
the total number of messages 
and the message-to-trade 
ratios for each unique 
identifier in Canadian market 
Menkveld (2013)  High Frequency Trading and 
the New-Market Makers 
Dutch local index stocks 
for both Chi-X and 
Euronext 
14.4% of all trades  Broker ID that fits all HFT 
characteristics 
Zhang (2010)  
High-Frequency Trading, 
Stock Volatility, and Price 
Discovery 
US  78% of dollar volume in 
2009 
HFTs are defined as all 
short-term trading activities 
by hedge funds and other 
institutional traders not 
captured in the 13f database 
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Table A2 : HFT Effective Dates as Defined by changes in Average Trade Size 
 
This table lists the Exchange name, HFT Effective date and Comparison test on both Mean and Median of average trading size for each 
exchange.  HFT identified prior to the start date of our sample for CHI-X, NASDAQ, and XET and hence are not listed here. 
Exchange Name  HFT Effective Date 
Mean Median 
Pre-HFT Post-HFT t-statistics Pre-HFT Post-HFT  P-value 
OMX 2005/04  10333.11  3520.41  16.73***  10342.00  2951.00  p<0.00*** 
SWX 2004/01  1816.58  372.08  21.22***  1746.50  340.50  p<0.00*** 
TMX 2005/05  2618.71  1245.60  20.04***  2586.50  1097.00  p<0.00*** 
NSE 2009/05  1002.61  441.08  15.29***  988.00  402.50  p<0.00*** 
BSE  2009/05  559.21  428.69  2.34**  514.50  376.50     p=0.4895 
TSE 2005/05  4409.64  3230.08  10.99***  4476.50  3150.00  p<0.00*** 
ASX 2006/04  11358.67  5122.21  15.32***  10772.00  4574.00  p<0.00*** 
NYSE 2003/05  1072.75  517.74  14.98***  1067.5  378.5  p<0.00*** 
LSE 2006/02  9793.97  3284.28  23.09***  9905.00  2487.00  p<0.00*** 
NZX 2004/11  8973.96  7046.03  4.26***  7774.50  6957.50  p<0.00*** 
OSLO 2005/04  7376.22  4368.37  6.11***  6736.00  3818.00  p<0.00*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  A3 : HFT Effective Dates as Defined by number of Cancellation  orders per 1000 traded shares 
 
This table lists the Exchange name, HFT start date and Comparison test on both Mean and Median of cancellation ratio for each exchange.  HFT 
identified  prior to the start date of our sample for CHI-X, London, and NASDAQ, and hence are not listed here.  For XET, the HFT effective 
date starts 2003/02. 
Exchange Name  HFT Effective Date 
Mean Median 
Pre-HFT  Post-HFT t-statistics Pre-HFT  Post-HFT  P-value 
TMX 2004/01  1.0051  6.9058  -10.0394***  0.9944  4.8666  p<0.00*** 
NSE 2009/05  1.3018  4.3661  -11.262***  1.5337  4.0662  p<0.00*** 
BSE 2009/06  0.9446  6.0677  -10.577***  0.6759  6.4829  p<0.00*** 
TSE 2004/04  0.4772  1.4154  -7.5344***  0.4816  0.8118  p<0.00*** 
ASX 2006/06  0.1370  0.3142  -22.9202***  0.1388  0.3135  p<0.00*** 
NYSE 2003/07  3.2300  7.4315  -14.8225***  3.2685  7.2748  p<0.00*** 
LSE 2004/02  0.3260  5.2619  -9.8659***  0.3196  3.2237  p<0.00*** 
OSLO 2005/02  0.7422  4.9244  -9.5636***  0.7303  2.3037  p<0.00*** 35 
 
Table A4: : HFT Effective Dates as Defined by Co-Location  
 
Exchange Name  Co-Location Offer Month  Note/Link 
 
Stockholm Stock Exchange 
 
2011/03 https://www.alipesnews.com/App.aspx#id=3474436580000000&languageId=4000 
Swiss Stock Exchange 
  2012/04 http://www.six-swiss-exchange.com/news/overview_en.html?id=inet_colo 
Toronto Stock Exchange 
  2008/04  Information provided by TMX Datalinx 
NASDAQ 2007/03  http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/common/mobile/iphone/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=352163&CompanyID
=NDAQ&mobileid= 
Bursa Malaysia 
  N/A   
NSE India 
  2010/01 http://www.nseindia.com/technology/content/tech_intro.htm 
Bombay Stock Exchange 
  2010/02  http://www.world-exchanges.org/news-views/co-location-services-bombay-stock-exchange-
premises 
Tokyo Stock Exchange 
  2010/01 http://www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/co-location/index.html 
Australia Stock Exchange 
  2008/Fourth Quarter  http://www.asxgroup.com.au/media/PDFs/mr030708_co-location_hosting.pdf 
XETRA Germany 
  2006/08  Information provided by XETRA Support 
NYSE 2008/04  https://europeanequities.nyx.com/sites/europeanequities.nyx.com/files/327777.pdf 
 
London Stock Exchange  2009/09 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/about-the-exchange/media-relations/press-
releases/2010/lsegmakescolocationdirectlyavailabletovendorsandserviceproviders.htm 
 
Chi-X London  2008/11  Information provided by ChiX Support 
 
Hongkong Stock Exchange  2012/Fourth Quarter  http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2011/documents/115_e_stone%20laying%20fa
ct%20sheet.pdf 
KOSDAQ 
  N/A   
Korea Stock Exchange  N/A 
Singapore Stock Exchange  2011/07  http://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/sgx_en/home/higlights/news_releases/sgx+offers+fastest+co
nnection+to+its+markets 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 
  N/A   
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
  N/A   
Taiwan Stock Exchange 
  2010/Fourth Quarter  http://www.world-exchanges.org/news-views/taiwan-stock-exchange-launch-co-location-services 
New Zealand Stock Exchange  N/A 
OLSO Norway  2010/04  http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Trade/Delta/The-strategic-partnership-with-the-
London-Stock-Exchange-Group 36 
 
 
Figure 1: Plot of indexed of average (market capitalization weighted) EOD price case. Market Capitalization weighted average suspected EOD 
price dislocation cases of HFT countries and non-HFT countries are shown here.  The values for HFT countries are presented surrounding the 
date 0, which is indexed to the start time of HFT in a particular country to compare pre- and post-HFT in a given country.  .  For non-HFT 
countries, the zero month is March 2007 (Mid-point).  The values for the non-HFT countries are also indexed to the zero date. 
 
 
Figure 2: Plot of indexed of average (market capitalization weighted) total trading surrounding per EOD price case. Market capitalization 
weighted total trading value surrounding per suspected EOD dislocation case of HFT countries and non-HFT countries are shown here.  The 
values for HFT countries are presented surrounding the date 0, which is indexed to the start time of HFT in a particular country to compare pre- 
and post-HFT in a given country.  For non-HFT countries, the zero month is March 2007 (Mid-point).  The values for the non-HFT countries are 
also indexed to the zero date. 
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Table 1.  
Definition of Variables 
This table defines our independent, dependent and control variables.  
 
Variable Name  Definition 
   
HFT (Average Trade Size)  Dummy variable indicates when HFT starts in the market, as listed in Table A2 in the Appendix.  
HFT (Cancellation Ratio)  Dummy variable indicates when HFT starts in the market, as listed in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
Co-Location   Dummy variable indicates when the exchange starts to offer the co-location services, as listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
  
Law/Legal Index  
DLLS Public enforcement index 
Public enforcement here is an index aggregating whether Public enforcement here is an index aggregating whether jail sentences 
for the approving body, or fine or jail sentence for the principal wrongdoer.  Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008a). 
Efficiency of the Judiciary Index 
Assessment of the ‘‘efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms’’ produced 
by the country risk rating agency Business International Corp. It ‘‘may be taken to represent investors’ assessments of 
conditions in the country in question.’’ Average between 1980 and 1983. Scale from zero to 10; with lower scores, lower 
efficiency levels Assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment.  Scale from zero to ten; with lower scores, 
lower efficiency levels.  Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
 
Rule of Law Indices 
Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country risk rating agency International Country Risk 
(ICR). Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from zero to 10, with 
lower scores for less tradition for law and order (we changed the scale from its original range going from zero to six). Original 
data comes from International Country Risk guide. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). 
Staff per million 
population(extrapolated sample) 
The 2005 size of the securities regulator’s staff, divided by the country’s population in millions.  Source: Jackson,  and Roe 
(2009). 
Surveillance Index 
The principal component of (1) single market surveillance and (2) cross market surveillance.  Source: Cumming and Johan 
(2008).  Available for a subset of countries, and provided contingent on maintaining confidentiality and anonymity as exchanges 
do not want market participants to know all of the things they do and do not look for in their surveillance.  Source: Cumming, 
Johan, and Li (2011). 
Exchange Trading Rule Index  Sum of insider trading rules index, market manipulation rules index, and broker-agency rules index. Source: Cumming, Johan, 
and Li (2011). 
  
Market Statistics   
Log (Market Capitalization)  Log of domestic market capitalization in USD millions. Source: Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC). 
Log (Volume)  Log of total value of shares trading in USD millions. Source: Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC). 
Log (Number of Trades)  Log of total number of trades in thousands in the same period. Source: Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC). 
Log (Market Volatility)  Log of market volatility.  Market volatility is calculated as stock market capitalization weighted volatility for each exchange. 
Source:  Source: Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC). 
Log (GDP Per Capita)  Log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the lagged period.  Source: GlobalInsight. (2003/01-2011/06). 
Log (Average Market Trade 
Size)  Log of average market trade size in the same period.  Source: Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC). 
Evidenced Measures of Market 
Quality   
Suspected the EOD Price 
Dislocation Cases 
Total number of suspected dislocating of the end of day price cases.  The SMARTS surveillance staff constructed the dislocation 
of EOD price case by looking at the price change between the last trade price (Pt) and last available trade price 15 minutes 
before the continuous trading period ends (Pt-15).  For securities exchanges that have closing auction, the close price at auction is 
used (Pauction). A price movement is abnormal if it is four standard deviations away from the mean abnormal price change during 
the past 100 trading days benchmarking period. To be considered as dislocation of EOD price case, the price movement between 
the last trade price (Pt) and the next day opening price (Pt+1), and between last trade price (Pt) and last available trade price 15 
minutes before the continuous trading period ends (Pt-15) has to be bigger than 50%.  (Pauction or Pt - Pt+1)/( Pauction orPt - Pt-15 ) ≥50%.  
Source: Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC).  
Average Trading Value 
Surrounding Per Suspected the 
EOD Price  Dislocation Case 
Average trading value surrounding each suspected dislocating EOD price case.  Source: Capital Markets Cooperative Research 
Centre (CMCRC). 
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Table 2.  
Trading Rule Indices  
 
This table summarizes the index values for the trading rules for each exchange, as defined in Table 1.  Panel A presents the trading rule index values for post-MiFID 
(Nov. 2007 – Jun. 2011; and in brackets are values for Jan. 2003 – Oct. 2007).  Panel B compares the mean of trading rule index among different legal origin.  The 
Cochran and Cox (1950) t-statistics are shown in Panel B and the *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 
 
Exchange 
Price 
Manipulation 
Index 
Volume 
Manipulation 
Index 
Spoofing 
Index 
False 
Disclosure 
Index 
Market 
Manipulation 
Index 
Insider 
Trading 
Index 
Broker 
Agency 
Index 
English Legal Origin              
Australia  3 (3)  1 (1)  2 (2)  0 (0)  6 (6)  2 (2)  0 (0) 
Bombay  0 (0)  1 (1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  3 (3)  2 (2)  3 (3) 
Canada  7 (7)  2 (2)  3 (3)  0 (0)  12 (12)  2 (2)  1 (1) 
Hong Kong  3 (3)  2 (2)  1 (1)  1 (1)  7 (7)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
India NSE  3 (3)  1 (1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  6 (6)  3 (3)  3 (3) 
London  7 (6)  2 (2)  3 (3)  1 (1)  13 (12)  3 (2)  0 (0) 
Malaysia  0 (0)  0 (0)  1 (1)  1 (1)  2 (2)  7 (7)  2 (2) 
NASDAQ  5 (5)  1 (1)  3 (3)  2 (2)  11 (11)  10 (10)  5 (5) 
NYSE  6 (6)  2 (2)  3 (3)  2 (2)  13 (13)  7 (7)  3 (3) 
Singapore  3 (3)  1 (1)  2 (2)  1 (1)  7 (7)  2 (2)  2 (2) 
              
Average English Legal Origin  3.83 (3.67)  1.25 (1.25)  2.00 (2.00)  1.00 (1.00)  8.08 (7.92)  3.67 (3.50)  1.83 (1.83) 
Median English Legal Origin  3.00 (3.00)  1.00 (1.00)  2.00 (2.00)  1.00 (1.00)  7.00 (7.00)  3.00 (2.00)  2.00 (2.00) 
              
German Legal Origin              
Germany  7 (0)  1 (0)  3 (1)  1 (0)  12 (1)  3 (2)  0 (1) 
Korea  4 (4)  2 (2)  2 (2)  1 (1)  9 (9)  3 (3)  2 (2) 
Shanghai  2 (2)  1 (1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  5 (5)  2 (2)  0 (0) 
Shenzhen  2 (2)  1 (1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  5 (5)  2 (2)  0 (0) 
Switzerland  7 (2)  1 (1)  3 (1)  1 (1)  12 (5)  3 (2)  1 (1) 
Taiwan  2 (2)  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  2 (2)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
Tokyo  1 (1)  0 (0)  1 (1)  0 (0)  2 (2)  1 (1)  0 (0) 
              
Average German Legal Origin  3.63 (2.13)  1.00 (0.88)  1.63 (1.13)  0.75 (0.63)  7.00 (4.75)  2.13 (1.88)  0.63 (0.75) 
Median German Legal Origin  3.00 (2.00)  1.00 (1.00)  1.50 (1.00)  1.00 (1.00)  7.00 (5.00)  2.50 (2.00)  0.00 (0.50) 
 
 
Scandinavian Legal Origin 
            
OMX  7 (2)  1 (1)  3 (2)  1 (1)  12 (6)  5 (4)  2 (2) 
Oslo  7 (2)  1 (1)  3 (1)  1 (0)  12 (4)  4 (3)  0 (0) 
              
Average Scandinavian Legal Origin  7.00 (2.00)  1.00 (1.00)  3.00 (1.50)  1.00 (0.50)  12.00 (5.00)  4.50 (3.50)  1.00 (1.00) 
Median Scandinavian Legal Origin  7.00 (2.00)  1.00 (1.00)  3.00 (1.50)  1.00 (0.50)  12.00 (5.00)  4.50 (3.50)  1.00 (1.00) 
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Table 2  (Continued) 
 
Panel B: 
 
Tests of Means 
Price 
Manipulation 
Index 
Volume 
Manipulation 
Index 
Spoofing 
Index 
False 
Disclosure 
Index 
Market 
Manipulation 
Index 
Insider 
Trading 
Index 
Broker 
Agency 
Index 
English versus Civil Law  -3.01*** 
(16.07***) 
5.74*** 
(8.76***) 
1.57 
(18.75***) 
6.33*** 
(13.37***) 
0.33 
(17.44***) 
7.90*** 
(11.33***) 
14.02*** 
(14.81***) 
              
English versus German  1.32 
(14.87***) 
5.09*** 
(8.25***) 
5.66*** 
(19.69***) 
7.32*** 
(11.94***) 
4.07*** 
(16.26***) 
11.76*** 
(14.25***) 
14.67** 
(15.26***) 
              
English versus Scandinavian  -29.75*** 
(19.54***) 
7.95*** 
(9.13***) 
-25.15*** 
(8.61***) 
0.00 
(9.71***) 
-22.78*** 
(17.14***) 
-6.41*** 
(0.00) 
6.55** 
(7.53***) 
              
German versus Scandinavian  -29.06*** 
(2.12**) 
0.00 
(-3.45***) 
-25.96*** 
(-6.90***) 
-10.82*** 
(2.41**) 
-24.60*** 
(-1.54) 
-30.57*** 
(-25.60***) 
-3.22*** 
(-2.48**) 
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Table 3.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents statistics for the full sample of country-month observations in the data.  The data span the months from January 2003 - June 2011, and the exchanges listed 
in Table 2.  Index from La Porta (1998, 2006), Jackson and Roe (2009) and DLLS (2008) are not available for China. 
 
 
Mean Median  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum  Number of 
Observations 
              
Suspected Dislocating the EOD Price Cases    36.56 15  86.03  0  1645  2196 
Total Trading Value Surrounding Per Suspected 
Dislocating the EOD Price Case 
  685637.8 142727 2408576  0  5.72e+07  2196 
HFT Dummy(Average Trade Size)    0.46 0  0.50  0  1  2196 
Co-Location Dummy    0.16 0  0.40  0  1  2196 
Total Trading Rule Index    11.48 11  5.85  2  26  2196 
Surveillance    18.54   14  13.93  3  41  2196 
Resource-based measures of public enforcement 
(Jackson and Roe, 2009) 
  20.52 12.53  19.42  .43  77.74  1992 
Public enforcement index (DLLS, 2008)    0.47 0.5  0.42  0  1  1992 
Rule of Law    8.32 8.98  1.98  4.17  10  1992 
Efficiency of the Judiciary    9.08  10  1.36  6   10   1992 
log(Market Capitalization)    29.83 29.39  2.55  25.91  38.56  2178 
log(Volume)    23.12 23.27  1.81  15.60  27.10  2196 
log(Number of Trades)    26.75 26.77  2.90  19.37  32.81  2196 
log(Average Market Trade Size)    7.96 7.87  1.62  5.16  12.88 2196 
log (Market Volatility)    -3.82 -3.79  0.69  -9.45  -1.61  2174 
log(GDP per capita)    9.57 1.39  10.20  6.14  11.44 2196 
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Table 4.                    
Comparison Tests       
 
This table presents the comparison of mean and median tests for number of suspected dislocating the EOD price cases (Panel A) and total trading 
value surrounding per suspected dislocating the EOD price cause (Panel B) for the period January 2003 to December 2007. Market capitalization 
weighted mean and median are used for the test. The *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Suspected Dislocating the EOD Price Cases    Panel B: Total Trading Value Surrounding Per Suspected 
Dislocating the EOD Price Case  
    All Countries  HFT Countries  All Countries  HFT Countries 
      HFT 
Countries 
Non-HFT 
Countries    Post -HFT  Pre-HFT       
HFT 
Countries 
Non-HFT 
Countries   Post -HFT  Pre-HFT 
Group  1  0 
 
1  0    Group  1  0 
 
1  0 
Number of 
Observations 
780 480    436 344    Number of 
Observations 
780 480    436 344 
Mean    3.541 0.635    1.052 6.697    Mean    40586.67  118325.6    22465.07  63554.75 
Standard 
Deviation  18.046 1.327    4.716 26.325    Standard 
Deviation  183767.8  607398.7    122898.5  237899 
Median    0.006 0.129    0.004 0.035    Median    27.82  269.01    35.45  18.75 
Difference in 
means (0-1)  -4.478***    3.927*** 
  Difference in 
means (0-1)  2.728***    2.912*** 
Difference in 
medians (0-1)  11.638***    6.012***    Difference in 
medians (0-1)  2.728***    -1.247 42 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
This Table presents Pearson Correlation coefficients for the full sample of exchange-months in the data.  The * indicate the correlations are statistically significant at least in the  5%  . 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12) (13) (14) (15)  (16) 
(1) 
Suspected EOD 
Price Dislocation 
Case 1 
(2) 
Total Trading Value 
Surrounding Per 
EOD Price 
Dislocating Case  -0.033  1 
(3)  HFT Dummy 
(Average Trade Size)  -0.0476*  0.0856*  1 
(4) Co-Location  Dummy  0.0101  0.0101  0.396*  1 
(5)  Exchange Trading 
Rule Index  0.0486*  0.0847*  0.336*  0.205*  1 
(6)  Surveillance  -0.106*  0.109* 0.163* 0.148* 0.582*  1 
(7) 
Public 
Enforcement(Jackson 
and Roe, 2009)  -0.115*  -0.0402  -0.214*  -0.0471*  0.0583*  -0.0486*  1 
(8)  Public Enforcement 
(DLLS, 2008)  -0.0785*  0.0611*  -0.0490*  -0.00332  -0.0411  -0.365*  0.110*  1 
(9) 
Efficiency of the 
Judiciary (LLSV, 
2006) -0.0493*  0.0508*  0.484*  0.121*  0.159*  -0.158*  0.345*  -0.0131  1 
(10)  Rule of Law (LLSV, 
1998) -0.262*  0.0879*  0.532*  0.119*  0.155*  0.0987*  0.268*  -0.0193  0.729*  1 
(11)  Log (Market 
Capitalization  0.0995*  0.0262 -0.0793*  -0.0293 -0.111*  0.250*  -0.371*  -0.483*  -0.335*  -0.399*  1 
(12)  Log  (Volume)  0.0317  0.00966 -0.230*  0.0800*  -0.0197 0.219*  0.398*  -0.374*  -0.0701*  -0.0806*  0.328*  1 
(13)  Log (Number of 
Trades) 0.0584*  0.0582*  -0.165*  0.0147  0.0435  0.419*  -0.242*  -0.370*  -0.515*  -0.431*  0.840*  0.580*  1 
(14)  Log (Average 
Market Trade Size)  -0.210*  -0.0527*  -0.428*  -0.263*  -0.527*  -0.355*  0.570*  -0.0398  0.215*  0.187*  -0.258*  0.390*  -0.216*  1 
(15)  Log (Market 
Volatility)  0.126*  -0.0663* -0.228*  -0.173*  0.0877* -0.0811* 0.0630* -0.152* -0.210*  -0.300*  0.203*  0.134* 0.234*  -0.0328  1 
(16)  Log (GDP per 
Capita)  -0.332*  0.114* 0.327* 0.168* 0.214*  0.295* 0.374*  -0.106*  0.359* 0.692* -0.114*  0.323*  0.0709*  0.262*  -0.173*  1 43 
 
Table 6: Regression Results 
This table presents Ordinary Least Square panel regressions of determinates of the number of suspected EOD price cases and the trading value surrounding each cases.  Variables are as defined in Table 1.  Standard Standard errors 
are clustered by exchange and month for models 3 and 4,  clustered by month for model 1 and 2, and clustered by year for Models 5-9.  Panel A presents regression results for the suspected dislocating the end of day (EOD) price 
cases. Panel B presents regression results for average trading value surrounding per suspected dislocating the EOD price case.  Model 1 and 2 present difference-in-difference (DID) tests: Treat is defined as HFT countries.  After is 
defined as date after the May 2006 (Average effective date of HFT in table A2, Appendix).  Model 1 is also controlled for fixed effect on the exchange level. Model 3 presents a regression result with market control variables as well 
as law index from LLSV (1998, 2006). Model 4 presents a regression result with the Total Trading Rule Index from Cumming, et al. (2010).  Model 5 presents the results with Public Enforcement Index from Jackson and Roe, 
(2009) and from Djankov, et al. (2008), Total Trading Rule Index from Cumming, et al. (2010), surveillance index from Cumming and Johan (2008)  and with Efficiency of the judiciary index and rule of law index from LLSV 
(1998, 2006).   Model 6 and Model 8 present the results with all index and control variables including and excluding data from the United States, respectively.  Model 7  and Model 9 replicates the Model6 and Model 8, respectively 
with alternative HFT dummy.  The *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All dependent variables are winsorized at 99% and t-statistics are in square brackets. 
Panel A: Suspected Dislocating the EOD Price Case  (Winsorized at 99%) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6   Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
   DID with Fixed 
Effect 
DID with Market 
Control Variables 
Market Control 
Variables 
Trading Rules and 
Surveillance Index 
Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  All Jointly 
(Alternative)  Without US  Without US 
(Alternative) 
Constant 7.167***  13.78  -221.7  -252.0**  -51.19  -152.1  -232.0  14.14  -71.16 
[8.24] [0.37]  [-0.57]  [-2.24] [-0.30]  [-0.70]  [-1.07] [0.09] [-0.44] 
Treat   -5.392* 59.02*** 
[-2.14] [4.69] 
After   8.450*** 5.725*** 
[10.74] [3.12] 
Treat x After  -8.403*  -7.638* 
[-2.16] [-2.00] 
HFT Dummy (Trade Size)  -33.34***  -28.25*** -34.62**  -34.16**  -40.07*** 
[-3.71] [-3.37]  [-2.98] [-2.92]  [-3.78] 
HFT Dummy (Cancellation Ratio)  -33.96** -36.31** 
[-2.78] [-3.15] 
Co-Location  Dummy  -4.681  -4.504  -4.783  -4.590 -6.099 -1.712 -4.157 
[-1.41] [-1.33]  [-0.55]  [-0.54] [-0.73] [-0.22] [-0.55] 
Law/Legal Index 
Total Trading Rule Index  1.007**  0.595 0.368 0.338 0.238 
[2.13] [1.09]  [0.59] [0.73] [0.43] 
Surveillance  0.0705 2.750  3.425*  -0.347  -0.137 
[0.11] [1.70]  [2.18] [-0.74] [-0.27] 
Public enforcement   -0.961*** -0.397  -0.560  -1.020***  -1.265*** 
(Jackson and Roe, 2009)  [-3.49] [-0.78]  [-1.08] [-4.01] [-5.61] 
Public enforcement  19.49 -27.59  -30.07  18.80  29.31 
 (DLLS, 2008)  [0.42] [-1.16]  [-1.27] [0.38] [0.60] 
Efficiency of the Judiciary  54.39**  7.722  25.19***  32.51***  7.519  10.62 
[1.99] [0.91]  [5.38]  [5.99] [0.73] [0.98] 
Rule of Law  -51.54***  -46.77*  -56.82* -61.56*  -36.95  -40.80* 
[-4.14] [-2.01]  [-1.94]  [-2.27] [-1.55] [-1.87] 
Microstructure Control Variables 
Log Market Capitalization  1.099  1.110  1.806  0.864  0.975  2.448  0.579  2.349 
[1.42] [0.72] [1.48] [0.34]  [0.38]  [0.90] [0.19] [0.78] 
Log Trading Volume  13.48***  9.137  -0.840  9.643  8.631  8.975  8.626  7.692 
[24.74]  [0.80]  [-0.10]  [0.94]  [0.83] [0.92] [0.75] [0.70] 
Log Number of Trades  -2.681**  -9.612  -2.012  -4.594  -3.601  -5.207  -4.599  -5.213 
[-2.94] [-0.80] [-0.26] [-0.37]  [-0.29]  [-0.42] [-0.34] [-0.40] 
Log Average Market Trade Size  -5.403***  -4.465  2.843  -6.651  -5.790  -0.608  -7.449  -0.233 
[-4.11] [-0.47] [0.33] [-0.93]  [-0.79]  [-0.10] [-0.95] [-0.03] 
Log  Market  Volatility  10.83***  5.501***  6.145***  6.411***  6.406*** 5.809*** 6.838*** 6.105*** 
[4.64] [2.69] [3.76] [4.45]  [4.45]  [3.60] [4.16] [3.38] 
Country Control Variables 
Log GDP per capita  -21.31***  39.82**  35.70***  39.04  37.72  37.42  29.07  29.83 
[-3.44] [2.17] [4.59] [1.23]  [1.18]  [1.26] [0.82] [0.93] 
Observations  2196  2174  1972  2174  1972  1972 1972 1768 1768 
R-squared  0.320  0.203  0.343  0.349  0.326  0.326 0.326 0.319 0.317 44 
 
 
Panel B: Total Trading Value Surrounding Per Suspected Cases (Winsorized at 99%) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6   Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
   DID with 
Fixed Effect 
DID with Market 
Control Variables 
Market Control 
Variables 
Trading Rules 
and Surveillance 
Index 
Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  All Jointly 
(Alternative)  Without US  Without US 
(Alternative) 
Constant  -267496.1***  -1866321.0***  -15522393.3***  -10614410.8*** -11131917.2*** -11265671.5*** -12186841.4*** -14155347.7*** -15176162.3*** 
[-8.65] [-3.19]  [-5.07]  [-5.34] [-5.87] [-3.75] [-4.37] [-4.75] [-5.38] 
Treat   219443.1** 449742.9*** 
[2.33] [4.15] 
After   456468.9*** 373654.6*** 
[10.09] [6.93] 
Treat x After  -281720.3*  -308068.6* 
[-1.90] [-2.09] 
HFT Dummy (Trade Size)  -422078.6***  -443645.7***  -370406.4**  -396880.6***  -364674.0** 
[-2.87] [-3.20]  [-2.56] [-3.48]  [-2.70] 
HFT Dummy (Cancellation 
Ratio)             -392476.7**    -409268.9* 
[-2.32] [-1.90] 
Co-Location  Dummy  161279.2  82889.6  170329.6 159097.4 141555.1 108006.4  88129.3 
[0.84] [0.45]  [0.88]  [0.60] [0.54] [0.40] [0.33] 
Law/Legal Index 
Total Trading Rule Index  -38065.2  -34528.3 -37124.3 -22780.1 -25401.9 
[-0.77] [-0.76]  [-0.84] [-0.51] [-0.58] 
Surveillance  -59680.8** 28962.3  36778.4  47852.0***  49840.7*** 
[-2.05] [1.27]  [1.60] [6.82] [6.75] 
Public enforcement   -8722.0 -4188.7 -6047.4 2112.2 -1576.3 
(Jackson and Roe, 2009)  [-0.63] [-0.26] [-0.37] [0.13] [-0.10] 
Public enforcement  2718959.5*** 2191516.1*  2163375.9*  2264895.6** 2351807.5** 
 (DLLS, 2008)  [3.25] [1.95] [1.94] [2.56] [2.75] 
Efficiency of the Judiciary  896705.1***  -245064.8  -4154.4  80387.1  5622.0  47900.7 
[3.78] [-1.51]  [-0.01]  [0.27] [0.03] [0.22] 
Rule of Law  -53184.3  76954.9  -150854.4  -204475.6  -415830.2  -498205.4 
[-0.36] [0.27]  [-0.32]  [-0.44] [-0.96] [-1.16] 
Microstructure Control 
Variables   
Log  Market  Capitalization  -84852.7* 34753.4  60092.3 45583.5 39153.0 56304.3 24294.6 39230.4 
[-2.16] [0.61] [1.25] [0.85] [0.59] [0.91] [0.34] [0.59] 
Log Trading Volume  -16854.9  314733.9*  415304.5***  250079.1  308813.8*  312467.1*  222740.0  227998.8 
[-0.73] [1.81] [2.99] [1.54] [1.87] [1.89] [1.18] [1.22] 
Log Number of Trades  131158.7***  -11029.0  -91051.8  154791.1  97174.7  78767.9  231920.2  215889.8 
[3.46] [-0.08] [-0.72] [1.17] [0.67] [0.55] [1.38] [1.31] 
Log Average Market Trade Size  -33466.4  -233356.8**  -333283.6***  -249051.9***  -299019.5*  -238540.0  -251755.3  -197075.6 
[-0.95] [-2.47] [-4.21] [-2.78] [-2.04] [-1.37] [-1.83] [-1.16] 
Log  Market  Volatility  -172241.1  159050.8  109653.7 162541.1 162831.4 155920.2 163720.2 156128.7 
[-1.59] [1.00] [0.75] [1.10] [0.94] [0.90] [0.91] [0.86] 
Country Control Variables 
Log GDP per capita  119313.9***  439456.3  738888.5**  338863.3  414919.7  409512.9  710042.3  786361.5 
[8.37] [1.29] [2.06] [0.96] [0.89] [0.86] [1.46] [1.59] 
Observations  2196  2174  1972  2174 1972 1972 1972 1768 1768 
R-squared  0.096  0.033  0.101  0.109 0.099 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 
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Table 7: 
Robustness Check. 
This table presents Ordinary Least Square panel regressions of determinates of the number of suspected EOD price cases and the trading value surrounding each cases.  Variables are as defined in Table 1 and regression model 
definitions are described in Table 6.  The *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Dependent variables are winsorized at 95% and t-statistics are in square brackets. 
 
Panel A: Suspected Dislocating the EOD Price Case  (Winsorized at 95%) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6   Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
   DID with Fixed 
Effect 
DID with Market 
Control Variables 
Market Control 
Variables 
Trading Rules and 
Surveillance Index 
Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  All Jointly 
(Alternative)  Without US  Without US 
(Alternative) 
Constant 7.260***  16.63  -206.2  -250.6**  -35.02  -137.4  -205.3  27.14  -44.88 
[9.54] [0.49]  [-0.62]  [-2.52] [-0.23]  [-0.74]  [-1.14] [0.19] [-0.33] 
Treat   -5.270** 56.50*** 
[-2.53] [5.16] 
After   7.944*** 5.409*** 
[11.46] [3.29] 
Treat x After  -8.378**  -7.805** 
[-2.58] [-2.45] 
HFT Dummy (Trade Size)  -27.66***  -23.23*** -28.47**  -27.96**  -33.48*** 
[-3.69] [-3.32]  [-2.84] [-2.78]  [-3.64] 
HFT Dummy (Cancellation Ratio)  -28.46** -30.57** 
[-2.77] [-3.15] 
Co-Location  Dummy  -3.650  -3.482  -3.611  -3.391 -4.625 -0.825 -2.860 
[-1.25] [-1.15]  [-0.48]  [-0.45] [-0.63] [-0.12] [-0.41] 
Law/Legal Index 
Total Trading Rule Index  1.034**  0.677 0.477 0.375 0.286 
[2.46] [1.56]  [0.95] [0.96] [0.63] 
Surveillance  0.124 2.740*  3.302**  -0.290  -0.114 
[0.22] [2.15]  [2.72] [-0.70] [-0.26] 
Public enforcement   -0.749** -0.185 -0.329  -0.807***  -1.016*** 
(Jackson and Roe, 2009)  [-2.89] [-0.42]  [-0.73] [-3.52] [-4.80] 
Public enforcement  21.19 -25.67  -27.92  18.36  27.12 
 (DLLS, 2008)  [0.56] [-1.25]  [-1.36] [0.47] [0.70] 
Efficiency of the Judiciary  49.04**  5.505  22.80***  28.96***  5.918  8.553 
[2.11] [0.77]  [5.85]  [6.60] [0.69] [0.95] 
Rule of Law  -46.91***  -42.73*  -52.50* -56.83**  -32.54  -35.91* 
[-4.50] [-2.15]  [-2.16]  [-2.58] [-1.63] [-2.02] 
Microstructure Control Variables 
Log Market Capitalization  0.701  1.115  1.700  0.888  1.014  2.210  0.694  2.169 
[1.13] [0.82] [1.54] [0.41]  [0.47]  [0.99] [0.28] [0.85] 
Log Trading Volume  12.93***  7.204  -2.337  7.453  6.302  6.697  7.137  6.399 
[22.43]  [0.72]  [-0.31]  [0.86]  [0.71] [0.80] [0.76] [0.72] 
Log Number of Trades  -2.388**  -7.223  0.194  -2.779  -1.650  -3.048  -3.296  -3.841 
[-2.72] [-0.69] [0.03] [-0.26]  [-0.15]  [-0.29] [-0.30] [-0.35] 
Log Average Market Trade Size  -5.147***  -3.861  3.104  -5.704  -4.725  -0.578  -6.752  -0.757 
[-3.92] [-0.48] [0.42] [-0.89]  [-0.72]  [-0.10] [-1.02] [-0.13] 
Log  Market  Volatility  10.20***  4.849***  5.568***  5.794***  5.788*** 5.288*** 6.165*** 5.550*** 
[5.03] [2.89] [3.94] [4.66]  [5.26]  [4.17] [4.81] [3.86] 
Country Control Variables 
Log GDP per capita  -20.30***  34.87**  32.35***  34.03  32.54  32.91  23.16  24.02 
[-3.77] [2.22] [4.79] [1.23]  [1.17]  [1.30] [0.77] [0.89] 
Observations  2196  2174  1972  2174  1972  1972 1972 1768 1768 
R-squared  0.368  0.233  0.389  0.396  0.372  0.372 0.373 0.361 0.360 
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Panel B: Total Trading Value Surrounding Per Suspected Cases (Winsorized at 95%) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6   Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
   DID with 
Fixed Effect 
DID with Market 
Control Variables 
Market Control 
Variables 
Trading Rules and 
Surveillance 
Index 
Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  All Jointly 
(Alternative)  Without US  Without US 
(Alternative) 
Constant  -234682.3***  -2057566.1*** -13350474.9*** -9681790.6***  -8017022.5***  -8088260.5***  -8622212.7***  -10690427.5***  -11353120.0*** 
[-8.15] [-7.95]  [-5.57]  [-6.76] [-5.64]  [-5.13]  [-6.30] [-7.23]  [-8.58] 
Treat   180201.7*** 365651.6*** 
[4.07] [4.07] 
After   396740.1*** 298843.6*** 
[8.61] [5.84] 
Treat x After  -254002.8***  -254449.9*** 
[-3.54] [-3.58] 
HFT Dummy (Trade Size)  -371319.2***  -397191.8***  -344925.3***  -360499.5***  -323712.6*** 
[-3.33] [-3.58]  [-3.80] [-3.82]  [-3.39] 
HFT Dummy (Cancellation 
Ratio)            -274742.9**    -284776.8* 
[-2.50] [-2.15] 
Co-Location Dummy  171832.9**  102457.3  174711.8  168104.2  151962.5  137293.9  117289.6 
[2.05] [1.27]  [1.14]  [1.12] [1.03]  [1.08]  [0.95] 
Law/Legal Index 
Total Trading Rule Index  -22150.6 -20312.3  -21030.7  -8869.2  -9489.6 
[-1.03] [-0.93]  [-1.01] [-0.39]  [-0.44] 
Surveillance  -81854.2*** 16803.4  22753.5  34386.4***  36076.3*** 
[-4.02] [1.34]  [1.82] [5.53]  [5.65] 
Public enforcement   3972.1 6592.6 6195.7 12330.1 10507.0 
(Jackson and Roe, 2009)  [0.44] [0.75] [0.76] [1.09]  [0.99] 
Public enforcement  1368410.9*** 1062182.1* 1063450.0**  1121664.7**  1207577.8** 
 (DLLS, 2008)  [3.60] [2.28] [2.34] [2.40]  [2.68] 
Efficiency of the Judiciary  770408.9***  -210215.7  -70053.9  -13995.4  -61693.6  -38158.9 
[3.98] [-1.58]  [-0.33]  [-0.07] [-0.34]  [-0.21] 
Rule of Law  -108388.6  -179231.7  -312238.1  -304723.7  -567518.3*  -593513.3* 
[-1.07] [-0.70]  [-1.02]  [-1.03] [-2.20]  [-2.29] 
Microstructure Control 
Variables   
Log Market Capitalization  -42208.8*  37332.7  56024.3**  44261.6  40478.7  57342.7  29936.8  44364.5 
[-2.10] [1.30] [2.25] [0.93]  [0.83]  [1.24] [0.56]  [0.87] 
Log Trading Volume  6833.7  202783.0**  286487.8***  161261.3  195813.7  185270.5  103569.3  94541.6 
[0.34] [2.05] [2.84] [1.82]  [1.77]  [1.67] [0.72]  [0.67] 
Log Number of Trades  91271.6***  -492.5  -55519.9  118204.2  84309.7  77857.5  208563.1  204729.5 
[3.84] [-0.01] [-0.58] [1.27] [0.72]  [0.68] [1.41]  [1.42] 
Log Average Market Trade Size  -21598.2  -235854.7***  -304461.7***  -246471.1*  -275866.0**  -209500.0  -216484.0*  -156994.5 
[-0.77] [-3.04] [-5.13] [-2.00]  [-2.41]  [-1.52] [-2.16]  [-1.23] 
Log Market Volatility  -55158.1  86077.6*  43871.8  84136.5  84307.3  79355.2  80574.3  74746.5 
[-1.68] [1.69] [0.90] [1.71]  [1.64]  [1.53] [1.50]  [1.39] 
Country Control Variables 
Log GDP per capita  93992.2***  576177.6***  861854.9***  510729.7  555472.1  474715.5  835791.9*  834484.9* 
[8.09] [2.65] [4.15] [1.35]  [1.45]  [1.21] [2.30]  [2.23] 
Observations  2196 2174  1972  2174  1972 1972 1972  1768  1768 
R-squared  0.172  0.049 0.185 0.197  0.181  0.182  0.180  0.184  0.183 47 
 
Table 8 
Robustness Checks with Alternative Dependent Variables 
This table presents Ordinary Least Square panel regressions of determinates of the number of suspected EOD price cases and the trading value surrounding each cases. Both dependent variables are either measured at the end of 
each month or measured with matching option expire dates.  Variables are as defined in Table 1).  Model 1 presents the results with Public Enforcement Index from Jackson and Roe, (2009) and from Djankov, et al. (2008), Total 
Trading Rule Index from Cumming, et al. (2010), surveillance index from Cumming and Johan (2008)  and with Efficiency of the judiciary index and rule of law index from LLSV (1998, 2006).   Model 2 and Model 4 present the 
results with all index and control variables including and excluding data from the United States, respectively. Model 3 repeats Model 1 without data from the United States. Standard errors are clustered by year. The *, ** and *** 
are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A1: Suspected Dislocating the EOD Price Case  (at the end of Month)    
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4     Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4 
   Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  Without US  Without US     Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  Without US  Without US 
Constant  -38.95** -51.75**  -34.39**  -33.00**  Constant  -31.89** -46.67**  -28.53*  -29.90 
[-2.32] [-2.88]  [-1.97] [-2.42]  [-2.01]  [-2.35] [-1.69]  [-1.85] 
  
HFT Dummy  -3.815*** -3.778***  -4.244***  -4.230***  Co-Location Dummy  -0.227 -0.192  0.120  0.113 
[-3.54] [-4.21]  [-3.82] [-4.97]  [-0.52]  [-0.22] [0.30]  [0.13] 
Law/Legal Index     Law/Legal Index 
Total Trading Rule Index  0.0466 0.0141  Total Trading Rule Index  0.0967 0.0862 
[0.82] [0.30]  [1.58] [1.50] 
Surveillance  0.370** -0.0563  Surveillance  0.392** -0.0365 
[3.11] [-0.97]  [2.81] [-0.68] 
Public enforcement (Jackson and 
Roe, 2009) 
-0.0640  0.0106  -0.0649  -0.0754  Public enforcement (Jackson and 
Roe, 2009) 
-0.0283 0.0517  -0.0223  -0.0270 
[-1.24] [0.16]  [-1.26] [-1.59]  [-0.57]  [0.67] [-0.45]  [-0.44] 
Public enforcement (DLLS, 2008)  3.838 -2.526  3.326  4.322  Public enforcement  (DLLS, 2008)  5.157 -1.569  5.163  5.892 
[0.91] [-1.03]  [0.76] [1.14]  [1.17]  [-0.64] [1.12]  [1.43] 
Efficiency of the Judiciary  0.164 2.562***  0.376  -0.0229  Efficiency of the Judiciary  -0.0570  2.420*** 0.0148 -0.368 
[0.18] [3.88]  [0.40] [-0.02]  [-0.06]  [3.45] [0.02]  [-0.32] 
Rule of Law  -5.578*** -7.031**  -5.023***  -4.750*  Rule of Law  -3.536** -4.972  -3.051*  -2.748 
[-3.25] [-2.66]  [-2.79] [-2.20]  [-2.31]  [-1.69] [-1.81]  [-1.09] 
Microstructure Control 
Variables          Microstructure Control 
Variables        
Log Market Capitalization  0.500** 0.508  0.435*  0.437  Log Market Capitalization  0.716*** 0.730  0.681***  0.691 
[2.03] [1.19]  [1.73] [0.94]  [2.95]  [1.84] [2.76]  [1.71] 
Log Trading Volume  0.859 0.781  0.840  0.814  Log Trading Volume  0.338 0.184  0.143  -0.00228 
[0.70] [0.78]  [0.66] [0.86]  [0.27]  [0.17] [0.11]  [-0.00] 
Log Number of Trades  -0.188 -0.112  -0.194  -0.167  Log Number of Trades  0.0234 0.181  0.152  0.308 
[-0.14] [-0.09]  [-0.14] [-0.13]  [0.02]  [0.14] [0.11]  [0.24] 
Log Average Market Trade Size  -0.549 -0.483  -0.688  -0.666  Log Average Market Trade Size  0.494 0.614  0.577  0.684 
[-0.64] [-0.79]  [-0.79] [-1.05]  [0.52]  [1.28] [0.60]  [1.43] 
Log Market Volatility  0.473** 0.472**  0.519**  0.518**  Log Market Volatility  0.467** 0.466**  0.517**  0.511** 
[2.36] [2.47]  [2.54] [2.48]  [2.27]  [2.33] [2.52]  [2.35] 
Country Control Variables     Country Control Variables 
Log GDP per capita  6.516*** 6.413*  5.843**  5.828  Log GDP per capita  3.043 2.897  2.375  2.356 
[2.60] [2.07]  [2.21] [1.82]  [1.40]  [0.89] [0.99]  [0.68] 
  
Observations  1972 1972  1768  1768  Observations  1972 1972  1768  1768 
R-squared 0.140  0.140  0.117  0.117  R-squared 0.132  0.132  0.106  0.106 
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Panel B1: Total Trading Value Surrounding Per Suspected Case  (at the end of Month)    
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4     Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
   Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  Without US  Without US     Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  Without US  Without US 
Constant  -649735937.5** -1.00468e+09**  -613067324.0*  -647152079.8  Constant  -568734083.7*  -
936833671.4**  -569487706.5* -629199797.0 
[-2.22] [-2.59] [-1.85] [-1.71]  [-1.93]  [-2.48] [-1.72] [-1.79] 
  
HFT Dummy  -37517189.7** -37025586.3* -41169193.1** -40970064.5*  Co-Location Dummy  -23604183.6 -23257616.4 -25810104.5 -25880687.9 
[-2.46] [-2.25] [-2.54] [-2.11]  [-1.08]  [-0.87] [-1.17] [-1.12] 
Law/Legal Index     Law/Legal Index 
Total Trading Rule Index  624452.2 197302.3  Total Trading Rule Index  949929.9 932331.2 
[0.25] [0.06]  [0.38] [0.31] 
Surveillance  10734972.9** 900137.2  Surveillance  10869318.7** 1020043.4 
[2.47] [0.46]  [2.43] [0.54] 
Public enforcement   4734310.1** 6874216.9* 4856329.3**  5041775.7  Public enforcement   4927703.5** 7099827.1* 5089612.5**  5317667.8 
[2.02] [2.09] [2.00] [1.79]  [2.07]  [2.09] [2.07] [1.80] 
Public enforcement  369610402.7** 184446260.6* 373159491.8**  357904051.1**  Public enforcement  379162166.7** 191701533.4** 387942196.3** 371351653.6** 
[2.50] [2.26] [2.42] [2.77]  [2.57]  [2.45] [2.53] [2.88] 
Efficiency of the Judiciary 
-
147373465.3***  -76792264.9  -
147111990.6***  -141457110.5**  Efficiency of the Judiciary 
-
148422531.7***  -77368654.6  -
150686222.8*** 
-
145403710.3** 
[-2.74] [-1.65] [-2.67] [-2.43]  [-2.74]  [-1.65] [-2.74] [-2.46] 
Rule of Law  47731863.2 3410607.8 55407454.4  51962405.9  Rule of Law  67083411.9 22766903.4 68174534.8 65359804.0 
[0.79] [0.07] [0.81] [0.78]  [1.21]  [0.56] [1.07] [1.08] 
Microstructure Control 
Variables          Microstructure Control 
Variables      
Log Market Capitalization  13683738.2 13797563.4 13100962.3 13134280.4  Log Market Capitalization  15474441.0* 15609940.5 14945043.3* 15046881.4 
[1.62] [1.14] [1.50] [1.09]  [1.83]  [1.26] [1.69] [1.17] 
Log Trading Volume  -97553900.9** -98597640.4** -100088489.0*  -100455114.6**  Log Trading Volume  -100535832.5**  -
102051755.7**  -104047378.5**  -
105620687.7** 
[-1.97] [-2.52] [-1.94] [-2.60]  [-2.01]  [-2.57] [-2.01] [-2.67] 
Log Number of Trades  107927948.2* 108952846.6** 110492953.7* 110866361.9**  Log Number of Trades  108128686.1* 109672869.2** 111976964.3* 113661686.1** 
[1.95] [2.32] [1.90] [2.33]  [1.94]  [2.31] [1.93] [2.36] 
Log Average Market Trade 
Size 
40473182.4  41360794.9  39674904.3  39980501.3  Log Average Market Trade 
Size 
48665515.1** 49840487.4** 48884567.7**  50043054.5* 
[1.54] [1.56] [1.47] [1.41]  [2.02]  [2.33] [1.99] [2.22] 
Log Market Volatility  6063559.9 6048336.3 6608081.1 6596162.9  Log Market Volatility  4949755.0 4942702.6 5112396.7 5054046.1 
[1.31] [1.13] [1.36] [1.23]  [0.97]  [0.74] [0.95] [0.75] 
Country Control Variables     Country Control Variables 
Log GDP per capita  -3273155.8  1972 -12295430.9 1768  Log GDP per capita  -35504442.9 -36933326.8 -35789254.9 -36000409.8 
[-0.04]  0.062  [-0.13]  0.061  [-0.50] [-0.53] [-0.43] [-0.41] 
  
Observations  1972  1972  1768  1768  Observations  1972 1972 1768 1768 
R-squared  0.062  0.062  0.061  0.061  R-squared  0.062 0.062 0.060 0.060 
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Panel A2: Suspected Dislocating the EOD Price Case  (Matched with option expiry date) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4     Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4 
   Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  Without US  Without US     Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  Without US  Without US 
Constant  29.76** 28.08**  34.00***  34.95***  Constant  -10.52 -16.53  -8.184  -10.14 
[2.43] [2.59]  [2.61] [5.38]  [-0.61]  [-0.86] [-0.49]  [-0.61] 
  
HFT Dummy  -1.951* -2.134**  -2.671**  -2.934***  Co-Location Dummy  0.574 0.608  0.608  0.602 
[-1.81] [-2.84]  [-2.25] [-4.78]  [0.85]  [0.91] [0.98]  [0.99] 
Law/Legal Index     Law/Legal Index 
Total Trading Rule Index  -0.309*** -0.347***  Total Trading Rule Index  0.0927* 0.0832 
[-3.40] [-4.25]  [1.95] [1.70] 
Surveillance  0.0865 0.0433  Surveillance  0.119 -0.0153 
[0.81] [1.71]  [1.13] [-0.74] 
Public enforcement   -0.179* -0.160**  -0.177*  -0.167**  Public enforcement   -0.0707 -0.0448  -0.0568  -0.0575 
[-1.86] [-2.37]  [-1.81] [-2.76]  [-1.34]  [-0.81] [-1.05]  [-1.07] 
Public enforcement  -10.98*** -11.27***  -11.92***  -11.44***  Public enforcement  0.0166 -1.988  0.0552  0.413 
[-2.77] [-6.62]  [-2.78] [-5.18]  [0.01]  [-0.85] [0.02]  [0.13] 
Efficiency of the Judiciary  2.515* 3.309**  2.828*  3.438**  Efficiency of the Judiciary  0.886 1.550*  0.991  0.755 
[1.80] [3.24]  [1.91] [3.34]  [1.21]  [2.16] [1.26]  [0.92] 
Rule of Law  -1.915 -2.988  -0.894  -1.608  Rule of Law  0.531 0.259  1.611  1.817 
[-1.20] [-1.58]  [-0.54] [-1.29]  [0.27]  [0.11] [0.90]  [1.06] 
Microstructure Control 
Variables          Microstructure Control 
Variables        
Log Market Capitalization  0.453** 0.350  0.375*  0.259  Log Market Capitalization  0.208 0.222  0.154  0.163 
[2.21] [1.46]  [1.85] [0.87]  [1.08]  [1.15] [0.76]  [0.81] 
Log Trading Volume  3.085* 3.367**  3.440**  3.791***  Log Trading Volume  1.112 0.964  1.218  1.078 
[1.96] [3.16]  [2.06] [3.72]  [1.17]  [1.00] [1.25]  [1.09] 
Log Number of Trades  -4.129** -4.216***  -4.284**  -4.419***  Log Number of Trades  -0.945 -0.795  -0.847  -0.697 
[-2.47] [-3.88]  [-2.44] [-3.97]  [-0.98]  [-0.82] [-0.83]  [-0.68] 
Log Average Market Trade Size  -1.015 -1.327  -1.555  -1.933**  Log Average Market Trade Size  0.386 0.501  0.129  0.232 
[-1.04] [-1.65]  [-1.53] [-2.64]  [0.55]  [0.69] [0.19]  [0.32] 
Log Market Volatility  0.233 0.263  0.332  0.377  Log Market Volatility  0.421* 0.420*  0.508**  0.503** 
[1.15] [0.89]  [1.62] [1.19]  [2.06]  [1.99] [2.57]  [2.63] 
Country Control Variables     Country Control Variables 
Log GDP per capita  1.143 1.751  -0.0226  0.315  Log GDP per capita  -0.801 -0.941  -2.176  -2.194 
[0.53] [0.97]  [-0.01] [0.19]  [-0.30]  [-0.36] [-0.89]  [-0.91] 
  
Observations  1972 1972  1768  1768  Observations  1972 1972  1768  1768 
R-squared 0.066  0.069  0.053  0.058  R-squared 0.093  0.094  0.081  0.081 
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Panel B2: Total Trading Value Surrounding Per Suspected Case (Matched with option expiry date) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4     Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4 
   Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  Without US  Without US     Public 
Enforcements  All Jointly  Without US  Without US 
Constant  -103172001.0*** -72595518.3*** -111253413.9*** -70441538.7*** Constant  -95655429.8***  -
98045192.1*  -105967046.3*** -104129619.5** 
[-3.83] [-3.45] [-3.82] [-3.44]  [-3.69]  [-2.30] [-3.71]  [-2.41] 
  
HFT Dummy  -4188307.1** -3676615.0** -4074299.7** -3769506.1**  Co-Location Dummy  184807.0 277601.4 -571114.6  -596132.5 
[-2.53] [-2.25] [-2.47] [-2.20]  [0.35]  [0.49] [-0.96]  [-0.79] 
Law/Legal Index     Law/Legal Index 
Total Trading Rule Index  134245.1* 137355.7*  Total Trading Rule Index  254346.5* 330460.7* 
[1.95] [1.81]  [2.20] [2.21] 
Surveillance  -163682.4* -255523.1***  Surveillance  -118395.8 -362857.3* 
[-1.72] [-3.39]  [-0.79] [-2.25] 
Public enforcement   41891.2 -75562.2 47854.2 -92680.5  Public enforcement   84370.1* 67886.9  84176.4*  21960.8 
[0.90] [-1.17] [0.99] [-1.47]  [1.93]  [1.03] [1.88]  [0.43] 
Public enforcement  2743201.5 3572288.5 3677889.6 5383160.3  Public enforcement  4260655.1 6436522.7  5364271.0  12009541.0* 
[0.59] [1.09] [0.75] [1.37]  [0.92]  [1.56] [1.12]  [1.94] 
Efficiency of the Judiciary  -1198518.9 -154636.9 -1592649.9 -806634.5  Efficiency of the Judiciary  -1464032.6  -
2595373.8**  -1941223.8 -4889863.8* 
[-0.86] [-0.17] [-1.09] [-0.73]  [-1.03]  [-2.54] [-1.32]  [-2.24] 
Rule of Law  -4561445.3* 2024563.9  -5750568.0**  2415713.9*  Rule of Law  -2304614.6 -1139467.3 -4019356.2*  -1900241.1 
[-1.94] [1.59] [-2.14] [1.79]  [-1.44]  [-0.35] [-1.90]  [-0.53] 
Microstructure Control 
Variables        Microstructure Control 
Variables        
Log Market Capitalization  1566533.3** 1933542.8** 1536220.6** 1940211.0**  Log Market Capitalization  1811021.6** 1847302.0  1759119.4**  1795215.5 
[2.18] [2.39] [2.14] [2.37]  [2.42]  [1.40] [2.38]  [1.41] 
Log Trading Volume  236482.9 238392.5 138900.2 199753.4  Log Trading Volume  -378450.1 -784342.9  -459036.4  -1016688.9 
[0.37] [0.37] [0.22] [0.29]  [-0.63]  [-1.08] [-0.73]  [-1.32] 
Log Number of Trades  948176.8  -179703.0 1209211.1 -131447.8  Log Number of Trades  1218873.1 1632332.7* 1493774.6*  2090916.8** 
[1.08] [-0.21] [1.31] [-0.15]  [1.45]  [2.22] [1.68]  [2.60] 
Log Average Market Trade 
Size 
-1540901.2*** 73899.2 -1501727.6*** 80006.8  Log  Average  Market  Trade 
Size 
-353686.5 -39084.3  -364850.9  45769.7 
[-2.87] [0.20] [-2.87] [0.19]  [-1.23]  [-0.11] [-1.18]  [0.14] 
Log Market Volatility  669041.6 644072.6 642496.1 644628.2  Log Market Volatility  683389.0 681500.7  603221.5  582539.4 
[1.30] [1.46] [1.24] [1.46]  [1.30]  [1.70] [1.14]  [1.52] 
Country Control Variables     Country Control Variables 
Log GDP per capita  9427670.2*** 702789.0  11099040.5***  741621.4  Log GDP per capita  5575928.1** 5193340.3  8027994.0**  7953151.0 
[2.59] [0.46] [2.68] [0.46]  [2.37]  [1.14] [2.57]  [1.33] 
  
Observations  1972 1972 1768 1768  Observations  1972  1972  1768 1768 
R-squared  0.165 0.159 0.166 0.159  R-squared  0.157  0.159  0.159 0.162 
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